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We inhabit a nomos—a normative universe. We constantly create
and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. The student of law may come to identify
the normative world with the professional paraphernalia of social control. The rules and principles of justice, the formal
institutions of the law, and the conventions of social order are,
indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small
part of the normative universe that ought to claim our attention.
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning.
⎯Robert Cover

1

Introduction
In 1990, Mr. Choudhury, a British Muslim, sought to bring a private
prosecution in the United Kingdom for what he regarded as blasphemous
attacks on Islam in Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. The Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate refused, however, to issue a summons for blasphemy against Rushdie and his publisher on the grounds that the offense
could not be committed where the religion concerned is not Christianity.2
Mr. Choudhury sought review of the decision in the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court.3 There, Lord Watkins confirmed that “as the law now
4
stands it does not extend to religions other than Christianity,” and the
5
application was refused.
Having exhausted his domestic remedies, Mr. Choudhury took his
complaint to the European Commission on Human Rights where he
claimed that the inability to prosecute Rushdie and his publisher in England for blasphemy violated his right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion under Article 9 and constituted discrimination on the basis
of religion under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).6 The nature of the complaint was not without precedent
1.
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court: 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
2.
R v. Chief Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex Parte Choudhury), [1991] 1 All E.R.
306 (Q.B) at 306; see also Robert McCorquodale, Blasphemous Verses, 50 Cambridge L.J. 22
(1991).
3.
Ex Parte Choudhury, [1991] 1 All E.R. 306 (Q.B) at 308.
4.
Id. at 318.
5.
Id. at 308–09, 318, 323 (declining to extend the common law offense of blasphemous libel to cover religions other than Anglicanism and, in certain respects, to Christianity as
a whole).
6.
Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17439/90, 12 Hum. Rts. L.J. 172 (1991);
see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 9,
14, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
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in ECHR jurisprudence. Eight years previously, the Commission had
upheld the successful prosecution of a British magazine for publishing a
poem found to be blasphemous to Christians partly on the basis that the
“main purpose” of the English common law offense of blasphemous libel is “to protect the rights of citizens not to be offended in their
religious feelings by publications.”7 In following the reasoning of the
U.K. Divisional Court,8 however, the Commission determined that the
British government had not interfered with Mr. Choudhury’s right to
freedom of religion and belief because there was no positive obligation
on states under the ECHR to protect all religious sensibilities.9 The fact
that the English law of blasphemy extended only to the Church of Eng10
land was not, accordingly, discrimination on the basis of religion.
The Commission’s decision infuriated the Islamic community in
Britain.11 It was soon followed in 1994 by a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights (the Court) upholding the Austrian government’s
seizure of the film Das Liebeskonzil (Council in Heaven) on the basis
that it constituted an attack on the Christian religion—Roman Catholicism in particular—by violating “[t]he respect for the religious feelings
of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 . . . by provocative portrayals of
objects of religious veneration.”12 Then, in 1996, the Court upheld again
a refusal by the British government to permit circulation of a film, Visions of Ecstasy, on the basis that the government had the legitimate aim
to “protect ‘the rights of others’ ” and to protect “against seriously offen13
sive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Christians.”

7.
Gay News Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8710/79, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 130,
¶ 11 (1982).
8.
In considering the ECHR, the Divisional Court decided that “the provisions of the
Convention concerning the right to freedom of religion and to protection from discrimination
on the ground of religion did not require an English law of blasphemy to protect the beliefs of
Islam.” McCorquodale, supra note 2, at 23; cf. infra text accompanying note 282 (discussing
how the Select Committee on Religious Offenses in England and Wales considered that the
law of blasphemy is discriminatory).
9.
R v. Chief Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex Parte Choudhury), [1991] 1 All E.R.
306 (Q.B) at 308.
10.
Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17439/90, 12 Hum. Rts. L.J. 172, 172–73
(1991); see also Stephen H. Bailey, David J. Harris & David C. Ormerod, Civil Liberties: Cases and Materials 1050–53 (5th ed. 2001); Paul Kearns, The Uncultured God:
Blasphemy Law’s Reprieve and the Art Matrix, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 512, 515 (2000).
11.
Javaid Rehman, Religion, Minority Rights and Muslims of the United Kingdom, in
Religion, Human Rights and International Law: A Critical Examination of Muslim
State Practices 521, 531–32 (Javaid Rehman & Susan C. Breau eds., 2007).
12.
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 17–18 (1994).
13.
Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1957 (1996); see also infra
note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s analysis in Otto-Preminger-Institut v.
Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1994)).
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As scholars have noted, these early cases in the Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence provide evidence of a disparity in the treatment of the claims
14
of majority and minority religious groups. Ghandhi and James thus observe:
The publication in September 1988 of Salman Rushdie’s book
The Satanic Verses, as is very well known, caused outrage
among both British and non-British Muslims. Copies of the
book were burned publicly across the world. Riots on the Indian
sub-continent resulted in deaths. The Ayatollah Khomeini issued
his notorious fatwa, which is still in existence. Yet the Divisional
Court concluded that, inter alia, the blasphemous libel of Allah
(Almighty God), the prophet Ibrahim, Muhammad the Holy
Prophet of Islam and the religion of Islam was not an offence
known to English law. The damage done by this book to interdenominational harmony was enormous and its effects are still
being felt by the author today. Yet, by contrast, an insignificant
18-minute video Visions of Ecstasy which would probably have
passed into a minute and unnoticed public circulation if the
Board had decided not to ban it, was entitled to the protection of
the full panoply of the English law of blasphemy. Such disproportionality brings the law into disrepute.15
If, with the benefit of hindsight, Mr. Choudhury’s case was a harbinger of the emergence of various problems associated with Islam and the
rights of Muslim minorities in European nation-states, then the events of
September 11, 2001 have propelled these issues to the forefront of law
and politics in a way unimaginable even a decade earlier. In Denmark,
cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad as a suicide bomber
have been published leading to protests and violence across Europe and
14.
See, e.g., Peter W. Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference 211
(2002) (“[If the ECHR] imposes some form of positive duty upon the State to protect sensibilities within the ambit of Article 9 belief systems . . . the current restriction of the offence
to the Church of England may be incompatible with the Convention not simply because of
non-discrimination arguments, but because the absence of a blasphemy law for non-Anglican
beliefs fails to properly protect the sensibilities of non-Anglican believers.” (footnote omitted)); Renáta Uitz, Freedom of Religion 160 (2007) (“The predominantly Christian
orientation of blasphemy provisions and their application exhibits a high potential for discrimination against non-Christian religions . . . .”); T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of
Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in Religious Human Rights
in Global Perspective 305, 310–11 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996)
(arguing that the Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence demonstrates a persistent denial of applications from religions that are “ ‘new,’ ‘minority,’ or ‘nontraditional’ ” as well as an “institutional
bias in favor of traditional religions”).
15.
Sandy Ghandhi & Jennifer James, The English Law of Blasphemy and the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 430, 450 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
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the Islamic world;16 a law prohibiting students in public schools from
wearing symbols or attire through which they conspicuously exhibit a
17
religious affiliation has been enacted in France; the French Parliament
has proceeded to enact a law which now bans the wearing of the burqa
and other Islamic face coverings in all public places;18 and a popular referendum has passed in Switzerland prohibiting the construction of
minarets during which a political party used posters depicting minarets
as missiles standing on top of the Swiss flag behind a woman wearing a
19
burqa.
This Article argues that what is most interesting about these controversies involving Islam and the place of Islamic norms in European
nation-states (and the international legal sphere more broadly) is how
such encounters are unsettling existing normative legal categories and
catalyzing reconsideration of both the historical and theoretical premises
of modern liberal political orders. These controversies raise two critical
questions for ECHR jurisprudence: First, what is the nature and scope of
the right to freedom of religion and belief? Does it include, for example,
a right to be free from injury or offense to religious sensibilities? If so,
why has the Court held that it is not discriminatory for a state to recognize and protect this right in the case of one religion (Christianity) but
not another (Islam)?
16.
Muhammeds ansigt, Jyllands-Posten, Sept. 30, 2005 (Den.), reprinted in Kevin
Boyle, The Danish Cartoons, 24 Netherlands Q. Hum. Rts. 185, 188, 191 (2006); Jytte
Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World (2009).
17.
Loi 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges
et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004 Regulating, in Accordance with the
Principle of Secularism, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing Denoting Religious
Affiliation in Public Primary and Secondary Schools], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190
[hereinafter Law 2004-228].
18.
Law 2010-1192 Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public Space was
signed into law by President Nicolas Sarkozy on October 11, 2010 and will come into force
on April 11, 2011. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l'espace public, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344, available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id. A similar law prohibiting the wearing of the burqa and niqab in public places was passed by the Belgian lower
house of parliament on April 30, 2010. Edward Cody, Belgian Lawmakers Vote to Ban FullFace Veils in Public, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042904504.html.
19.
Stephanie Nebehay, Swiss Voters Back Ban on Minarets in Referendum, Reuters,
Nov. 29, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/29/us-swiss-minaretsidUSTRE5AS12D20091129; see also Lorenz Langer, Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy? The Swiss
Ban on Minarets, 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 863 (2010).
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Second, what is the relationship between religion and morality20 in
the “secular” public sphere?21 This question applies, not only to the public realms of different European nation-states, but also to the
22
supranational nomos of the European Court of Human Rights itself.
20.
The relationship between religion and morality in the public sphere has been the
subject of vigorous recent debate in legal and political theory. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Religion and Morality in the Public Square: Excerpts from Keynote Address, 22 St. John’s J.
Legal Comment. 417 (2007) (distinguishing “republican” and “pluralist” conceptions of the
public sphere and “freestanding” and “religion-based” conceptions of morality); Symposium,
Constitutionalism and Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival: The Challenge of Global
and Local Fundamentalisms, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2331 (2009); Programs: Religion and the
Public Sphere, Soc. Sci. Res. Council, http://www.ssrc.org/programs/religion-and-thepublic-sphere (last visited May 29, 2011) (seeking to “deepen the engagement and cooperation of social scientists working on religion, secularism, and related topics, and to expand
critical scholarship in this crucial area of study”).
21.
The concept of the “public sphere” in liberal political theory is often traced to the
1962 book, Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1991). For Habermas, the public sphere “designates a theater in modern societies
in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which
citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive
interaction.” Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy, 25/26 Soc. Text 56, 57 (1990) (suggesting that Habermas’s
conception of the public sphere is “conceptually distinct” from both the state and the “official–
economy”). In this Article, the term “secular public sphere” is used in the sense of Talal
Asad’s more recent work on secularism as a political doctrine, which both draws attention to
and critiques the Habermasian conception:
The idea of the public sphere rests on a binary scheme: public vs. private. The public sphere is also thought of as part of a tertiary structure, the space of general
communication and information that mediates between the overarching state and
the many restricted spaces of daily life. Its historical origin is reflected in the growing power and need of the bourgeoisie in early capitalist society. This development
has been seen not only as a step in the emergence of a modern public, but as essential to the formation of liberal democracy. Essential to that formation also is the
political doctrine of secularism.
Talal Asad, Reflections on Laïcité and the Public Sphere, 5:3 Items & Issues (Soc. Sci. Res.
Council, New York, N.Y.), 2005, at 1. For Asad, the critical point is that the liberal public
sphere is not only “a forum for rational debate but [also] an exclusionary space . . . necessarily
(not just contingently) articulated by power.” Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular:
Christianity, Islam, Modernity 183–84 (2003) [hereinafter Asad, Formations of the
Secular]. See infra Part I.
22.
My use of the term nomos refers to the dual nature of the public sphere as simultaneously a space of discourse and exclusion. Robert Cover’s use of the term, supra note 1, was
animated by his concern for the violence of the imposed order of the state on ways of life of
plural communities. For Cover, a nomos was a “normative world [in which] law and narrative
are inseparably related.” Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in Narrative, Violence
and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover 95, 96 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan &
Austin Sarat eds., 1995). In the nomos of the state “the creation of legal meaning—
‘jurisgenesis’—takes place through an essentially cultural medium,” id. at 103, and while
simultaneously the state exercises its “jurispathic” mode of coercively suppressing the “fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle,” id. at 139. Cover’s thesis points to the radical dichotomy
between the social organization of law as meaning and as power:
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How does the Court imagine and construct notions of secularism and
neutrality in each sphere? What role, politically and normatively, does
the margin of appreciation doctrine play in this aspect of the Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence?
This Article argues that Choudhury and subsequent Article 9 cases
reveal various connections and contradictions between these two sets of
questions. The nature of the public sphere is dynamically related to the
scope of the right to religious freedom. This Article’s central claim is
that this relationship has been defined both conceptually and historically
by not one but two rival liberal traditions each of which remain deeply
entangled in the normative structure of Article 9 and continue to shape
the contours of ECHR religious freedom jurisprudence. The difficulty
is that the two traditions are often run seamlessly together without distinguishing their different logics and genealogies. It is thus
Karo’s commentary and the aphorisms that are its subject suggest two corresponding ideal-typical patterns of combining corpus, discourse, and interpersonal
commitment to form a nomos. The first such pattern, which according to Karo is
world-creating, I shall call “paideic” . . . . The second ideal-typical pattern, which
finds its fullest expression in the civil community, is “world maintaining.” I shall
call it “imperial.”
Id. at 105–06 (discussing R. Joseph Karo, Beit Yosef at Tur: Hoshen Mishpat 1 (Robert
Cover trans.)). The broader notion of a “supranational” nomos refers to the Westphalian story
of the rise and consolidation of “secular” European nation-states over the last three centuries
and their reconfiguration following the Second World War into the Council of Europe. See
generally Peter G. Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in International Law Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & Religion 455 (2008) [hereinafter Danchin, Emergence
and Structure]. I have previously described the historical shift in Europe from the ius gentium
of the homogenous respublica christiana to the ius inter gentes of the territorially delimited
jus publicum europaeum as having had
two interrelated jurisgenerative dimensions—one as between European states inter
se (i.e., as between the newly recognized political subjects of the former unified
Christian nomos), and the other as between European states taken as a whole and
non-European peoples and territory (i.e., as between European states separated as
political subjects but united by their background identity and culture and those peoples and territories lying outside of Western Christendom).
Id. The notion of a “supranational public sphere” standing beyond but encompassing the public spheres of European nation-states raises for consideration the nature of the modern
European jus gentium viewed against the background of the older respublica christiana and
jus publicum europaeum. Carl Schmitt first used the term nomos as early as 1934 to describe
the spatial, political, and juridical system of Europe in terms of a “total and concrete historical
order.” G. L. Ulman, Introduction to Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 9, 19–20 (G. L. Ulman trans., Telos
Press 2003) (1950) (quoting Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des Rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (1934)); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law as
Political Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?, 11 Constellations 492, 496 (2004)
(discussing Schmitt’s political conception of “concrete-order thinking” as going beyond positive laws and seeking “to grasp the substance of the choice on which a community’s identity
depends”).
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commonplace for judges and scholars alike to describe the public
sphere in terms of “neutrality” and the right in terms of “freedom” when
in fact these concepts serve quite distinct values in each tradition. By
critically reexamining how, as a matter of history, the concept of religious freedom has become embedded in European legal norms, this
Article aims to illuminate and clarify these normative dispositions in
order to offer insight into a series of related dilemmas that confront us
today.
In the first, older liberal tradition the public sphere was understood
in terms of social peace and religious liberty conceived in jurisdictional
terms. This early conception derived from a civil philosophy that sought
to desacralize the state and led over time to both the churches losing
their civil and political authority and to the gradual spiritualization of
religion. In the second, later tradition the public sphere was reconceived
in terms of a moral theory of justice and religious liberty grounded in a
complex (and unstable) notion of freedom of conscience. This conception derived from a metaphysical philosophical tradition that
simultaneously sacralized reason and rationalized religion.23
Each of these traditions encompasses both rationalist and dialogic
elements. In the case of the former, this double structure resulted in politically negotiated religious settlements and varying church-state
arrangements; in the case of the latter, it generated a new secular morality and theory of liberal political order premised on distinctive
(Protestant) conceptions of the individual, freedom, and religion. In each
case, the demands of rationality and reason and their political implications for the state differed, as did the forms of negotiation (whether
actual or imagined) between the secular and religious. But despite these
national variations and theoretical differences, what each tradition shared
was a conception of the public sphere and public reason on the one hand,
and of the right to religious freedom on the other, which were conceived
internally to Western Christianity and its complex relationship to the rise
of the “secular” European nation-state. In each case, therefore, the neutrality of the public sphere (whether national or supranational) and the
scope of the right to religious freedom should be understood as culturally and historically contingent and neutral towards neither religion in
general nor distinct religious traditions in particular.
As the dominant religious tradition in Europe, Christianity continues
to shape significant aspects of both the state and state law. This is an
23.
This Article argues that this tradition finds its origins in Kant’s philosophy of religion and the distinction between the public and private uses of reason, a distinction that has
been substantially reversed in the modern secular imaginary of freedom of conscience. See
infra Part III.A.1.

DANCHIN FTP 1_C.DOC

Summer 2011]

7/8/2011 9:24:23 AM

Islam in the Secular Nomos

671

embarrassment for liberal theories of rights and their assumption of state
neutrality. Given Europe’s deep history of church-state entanglement,
neutrality in this context must mean nondiscrimination rather than nonestablishment.24 The application, however, of the nondiscrimination
principle in nation-states with an established or dominant religion gener25
ates an obvious tension as to which the margin of appreciation doctrine
proves simultaneously useful and problematic: useful in allowing the
European Court of Human Rights to defer to majoritarian conceptions of
public order; problematic in tacitly excusing denials of individual freedom and equal treatment.26
24.
A number of states in Europe including Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have official or established churches while various others have
different forms of endorsed church or cooperationist regimes. See generally State and
Church in the European Union (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2d ed. 2005). The ECHR contains
no equivalent to the Establishment Clause found in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and thus does not prohibit member states either endorsing or cooperating with religions,
including through recognition or presence of religious symbols in official settings, provided
the state respects all ECHR norms including the rights to religious freedom (Art. 9) and equality and nondiscrimination (Art. 14). ECHR, supra note 6, arts. 9, 14. In Darby Case, 187 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 17 (1990), the European Commission held that establishment is not per se a violation
of the ECHR. See also Carolyn Evans & Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in
the European Court of Human Rights, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 699, 699 (“[The ECHR] does not
deal directly with the relationship between church and state in European countries. . . . [Rather
it] emphasize[s] religious freedom and nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. . . . [Thus it
does] not require a particular degree of separation or attachment between religions and the
state and . . . [does] not explicitly prohibit establishment.”).
25.
The doctrine of a “margin of appreciation” is an interpretive principle designed to
balance a state’s sovereignty with the need to ensure observance of the ECHR and thereby
“avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and Contracting States.” Ronald St. J.
Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in The European System for the Protection of
Human Rights 83, 123 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993). It is based on the idea
that the primary responsibility for the implementation of the ECHR lies with the parties themselves and thus encompasses a discretion afforded by the Court to member states to employ
varying national standards of conventional protections. See id.; see also Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 843,
850 (1999) (“To grant margin of appreciation to majority-dominated national institutions in
such situations is to stultify the goals of the international system and abandon the duty to protect the democratically challenged minorities.”).
26.
See Malcolm Evans & Peter Petkoff, A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of
Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 36 Religion, St. &
Soc’y 205 (2008). Although “[n]eutrality may be the product of a desire to create an environment in which all are able to make ultimate choices in an unfettered fashion,” id. at 205,
the way it has been developed by the ECHR, marks a departure from an understanding of human rights as legal tools, and as far as freedom of religion or belief is
concerned, has resulted in a problematic notion of what neutrality entails. Neutrality has become associated too closely with what might be described as an alignment
with the political, a politically correct use of human rights within a simplified and
fairly finalised philosophical world view, hostile to other philosophical world
views.
Id. at 216.
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This dynamic relationship between the right to religious liberty and
the nature of the public sphere has assumed different forms in European
nation-states. In England, Mr. Choudhury was unable to rely on the law
of blasphemy, which was found to extend only to the established Church
of England and to protect the rights of Christians.27 By contrast, in
France, a Muslim schoolgirl is unable today to wear an Islamic headscarf
28
in a public school. In each case, a complex historical and normative
relationship between Christianity and secularism defines the modern
contours and shape of the public sphere and the right to freedom of religion and belief itself. In each case, it is also the presence of non-Christian
plaintiffs asserting claims of right that makes visible both the historical
contingency and cultural particularity underlying the Court’s interpretation of each of these two sets of norms.
How, after all, is the Court to make these kinds of determinations
and identify in a neutral way those manifestations of religion or belief to
be accommodated? The controversial notion that injury to religious feelings falls within the scope of Article 9 illustrates the point. Arguably,
such a claim of right is less threatening to other rights (such as free
speech) and more justifiably “necessary in a democratic society”29 when
all the relevant factors are internal to a Christian or post-Christian narrative as to what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity.
Both nomos and narrative are radically disrupted, however, when the
claim is of the kind advanced by Mr. Choudhury.
Similarly, the tacit background assumptions shaping the publicprivate divide—religion as primarily a matter of belief or conscience
whose proper place is in the private sphere—become more visible when
it is a Muslim who seeks to manifest a non-Christian belief or practice in
the public sphere. At the same time, the extent to which certain secular
and religious manifestations of Christian doctrine and practice remain
embedded in different registers of the public sphere remains in evident
contradiction to the formal claims of liberal theory.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by considering
what is meant by the term “secular public sphere.”30 In light of the controversies involving Islam discussed above, this Part observes how in
both secular and religious fields of inquiry such events have unsettled,
and led to attempts to rethink, certain core premises of secular liberalism
in general and justifications for the right to religious freedom in particular. Part II then sets out the major contours and developments in the
27.
28.
29.
30.

See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
See Law 2004-228, supra note 17.
ECHR, supra note 6, art. 9(2).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence. Beginning with the landmark Kokkinakis
case in 1993,31 this Part examines ECHR jurisprudence regarding, first,
the rights of religious minorities; second, the “injury to religious feel32
ings” cases; and third, Islam and the claims of Muslim communities
and individuals in European nation-states.
On this basis, Part III seeks to situate and analyze the place of Islam
and Islamic norms within the normative structure of Article 9. In considering the recent enactment in the United Kingdom of the offence of
incitement to religious hatred and the simultaneous abolition of the
common law offense of blasphemy, this Article concludes by arguing
that there is a need to recover plural Enlightenment traditions and to better understand how the historical evolution of liberal rights discourse
continues to shape our contemporary understanding of claims to religious freedom.

I. The Concept of the Secular Public Sphere
What is a “secular public sphere”?33 What problems does it address
and what ideals or aspirations does it embody? Further, what is the relationship between a nomos of this kind and the right to freedom of
religion or belief? These are broad and complex questions. Drawing on
the work of William Connolly in political theory,34 the argument in this
Part develops in three stages.
Section A begins by identifying three dilemmas for modern conceptions of secularism: first, the almost axiomatic equation of religion and
religious practice with “freely chosen conscience or belief” and the double transformation that has occurred in modern understandings of the
right to religious freedom (Subsection 1); second, the fragile divide
between public and private spheres and the difficulties this notion generates for claims to a freestanding “rational” morality in the public
sphere (Subsection 2); and third, the question of how to secure secular
authority in the public sphere (Subsection 3). In response to these dilemmas, Section B outlines a number of recent theoretical shifts we see
31.
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1993).
32.
See, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser A) at 18 (1994)
(“The respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 can legitimately
be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration
. . . .”); see also infra note 105 and accompanying text.
33.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34.
In particular, the argument draws upon Connolly’s pluralist conception of a “possible world of intersecting publics, expressing a variety of religious and metaphysical
orientations, interacting on several registers of being.” William E. Connolly, Why I Am
Not a Secularist 8 (1999).
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underway in competing conceptions of liberal modernity. Finally, on the
basis of the preceding analysis, Section C sets out some initial implications and conclusions as they pertain to the premises and methodology of
the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
A. The Antinomies of Secularism
For Connolly, secularism “combines a distinctive organization of
public space with a generic understanding of how discourse and ethical
judgment proceed on that space.”35 The key idea is of a “self-sufficient
public realm fostering freedom and governance without recourse to a
specific religious faith.”36 The “historical narrative” explaining and justifying this conception of secular public space is generally described as
follows:
Once the universal Catholic Church was challenged and dispersed by various Protestant sects a unified public authority
grounded in a common faith was drawn into a series of sectarian
conflicts and wars. Because the sovereign’s support of the right
way to eternal life was said to hang in the balance, these conflicts were often horribly destructive and intractable. The best
hope for a peaceful and just world under these new circumstances was institution of a public life in which the final
meaning of life, the proper route to life after death, and the divine source of morality were pulled out of the public realm and
deposited into private life. The secularization of public life is
thus crucial to private freedom, pluralistic democracy, individual
rights, public reason, and the primacy of the state. The key to its
success is the separation of church and state and general acceptance of a conception of public reason (or some surrogate)
through which to reach public agreement on nonreligious
issues.37
Despite the evident power and enduring appeal of this story, there are at
least three dilemmas that, from the beginning, have haunted the historical modus vivendi we today term “secularism.”

35.
Id. at 20.
36.
Id. at 21. Thus for modern liberal theorists such as John Rawls, the point is that
“secularism strains metaphysics out of politics.” Id. at 22. In a work such as Rawls’s Political
Liberalism, “the idea is to dredge out of public life as much cultural density and depth as possible so that muddy ‘metaphysical’ and ‘religious’ differences don’t flow into the pure water of
public reason, procedure, and justice.” Id. at 23.
37.
Id. at 20.
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1. The Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief
The right to religious freedom is often referred to simply as “free38
dom of conscience or belief.” This subtle shift in terminology is in fact
the product of two deeply entangled historical and normative transformations that have occurred in modern secular discourse on religious
freedom. The first concerns the definition of religion itself as conscience
or belief in an age of what we might term “secular equality.” The second
concerns the partial and unstable convergence in liberal theory between
conscience on the one hand and autonomy on the other, and the resulting
reversal in the secular imaginary whereby freedom of conscience is today viewed as autonomy. Let us briefly consider each of these
transformations in turn.
a. Freedom of Religion or Freedom of Conscience?
What is the proper object of the right to religious freedom in international law? Like most national constitutions that contain clauses
guaranteeing freedom of religion, none of the major international and

38.
See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008) (describing “America’s great tradition of
religious freedom” in terms of the “essential idea” of “liberty of conscience”); Noah Feldman,
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 Calif. L. Rev.
673 (2002) (arguing that the traditional First Amendment commitment to freedom of conscience has substantially been replaced by a commitment to equality); Symposium, Freedom
of Conscience: Stranger in a Secular Land, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 899 (2010); see also Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Requiem for the Establishment Clause, 25 Const. Comment. 309
(2008); cf. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religion Naturalized: The New Establishment, in After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement 84, 94–95 (Courtney Bender and
Pamela E. Klassen eds., 2009) (noticing in U.S. constitutional law “a shift in what religion is
understood to be—a shift in religious anthropology” and a “move away from the high separationism of the mid-twentieth century toward what we might call a post-pluralistic
acknowledgment of religion as natural or universal . . . [so that] [n]ow religion includes everybody, even those without religion”). Sullivan notes that Kent Greenawalt’s Religion and the
Constitution: Establishment and Fairness privileges a “free church model” of religion
understood as the “voluntary association of individuals with communities of others who are
like–minded in their transcendent commitments . . . [but Greenawalt’s book has] very little
acknowledgment that religion is changed by the freedom he celebrates.” Sullivan, Requiem,
supra, at 309–310. According to Sullivan, Greenawalt thus views Anglicans in England under
establishment as having diminished religious freedom without acknowledging that
[t]hose he pities would not be Anglicans if they had the capacity to choose their
leaders and form of government. To be Anglican is to believe that apostolic succession is God-given and that its administration is intimately connected with the
Crown. Indeed, for most religious people everywhere at most times, religious leadership, and the form of government of one’s religious community, is, in some sense,
given, not chosen, and related in explicit ways to government. Those are aspects of
religion that gives it its authority and its comfort.
Id. at 310.
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regional human rights instruments define the term “religion.”39 Instead
they try to avoid this controversy by defining legal protections (rights) in
terms of freedom of religion or by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion thereby focusing legal inquiry on what is meant by the
terms “freedom” or “discrimination.”40 The difficulty, of course, is that
any attempt to define the scope and content of the right to religious liberty will necessarily involve assumptions about the underlying nature of
religion itself.41 Such assumptions rest on often unarticulated premises
concerning the metaphysical, psychological, or cultural aspects of religion. The danger then is that legal definitions “may contain serious
deficiencies when they (perhaps unintentionally) incorporate particular
social and cultural attitudes towards (preferred) religions, or when they
fail to account for social and cultural attitudes against (disfavored) religions.”42
These concerns arise in the context of liberal theories of religious
freedom where religion is viewed primarily as “a matter of privatized
belief in a set of creedal propositions to which an autonomous individual
43
gives assent.” Such a conception of religion as belief or conscience is
39.
The most exhaustive efforts to date to define the scope of the right (although not
“religion” itself) in international human rights law remain the 1981 Declaration on Religious
Intolerance, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/55, at 171 (Nov. 25, 1981), and the 1993 General Comment (No. 22) of the Human
Rights Committee on the scope of Article 18 under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [ICCPR]. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sept. 27, 1993) [hereinafter ICCPR General Comment].
40.
See, e.g., Carolyn Evans & Beth Gaze, Between Religious Freedom and Equality:
Complexity and Context, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 40 (2008) (discussing the “tension
between religious freedom and non-discrimination principles” in international human rights
treaties).
41.
See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Volume I: Free
Exercise and Fairness 124–56 (2006); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 753 (1984). At the level of theory the point is well illustrated by
Rawls’s notion of an “equal liberty of conscience” as part of a political conception of justice.
The idea is that “by avoiding comprehensive doctrines [i.e., basic religious and metaphysical
systems] we try to bypass religion and philosophy’s profoundest controversies so as to have
some hope of uncovering a basis of a stable overlapping consensus.” John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 151–152 (1993). But as Connolly astutely observes, the “word ‘avoid’ is revealing
because it mediates effortlessly between a demarcation established by some philosophical
means and one commended because its political acceptance prior to introduction of an impartial philosophy of justice would reduce the intensity of cultural conflict.” Connolly, supra
note 34, at 22. In this move, the “word ‘religion’ now becomes treated as a universal term, as
if ‘it’ could always be distilled from a variety of cultures in a variety of times rather than representing a specific fashioning of spiritual life engendered by the secular public space carved
out of Christendom.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
42.
T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in
International Law, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 189, 195 (2003).
43.
Saba Mahmood, Secularism, Sexual Difference, and Religious Minorities: A Contested Genealogy 2 (July 6, 2010) (unpublished paper) (on file with author); see also infra
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said to be a “modern, privatized Christian one because . . . it emphasizes
the priority of belief as a state of mind rather than as constituting activity
44
45
in the world.” In the wake of Enlightenment theorizing about religion,
this represents the supposed solution to an enduring puzzle: how is the
state to be neutral between religion and nonreligion while at the same
time according religion special protection?46 As Andrew Koppelman observes, the idea of “[c]onscience promises a way out of the dilemma by
describing the basis of free exercise [of religion] in a way that specifies
only the internal psychology of the person exempted, without endorsing
any claims about religious truth.”47
notes 299–300 and accompanying text. As noted by Gunn, religion regarded as belief is only
one facet of religion in the modern world. See Gunn, supra note 42, at 200. Religion is also a
critical facet of identity that is “less likely to emphasize shared theological beliefs and more
likely to emphasize shared histories, cultures, ethnicity, and traditions.” Id. at 201. It is thus
“among the most potent social forces that bind communities together.” Id. at 202. Religion is
also a “way of life” and thus “associated with actions, rituals, customs, and traditions that may
distinguish the believer from adherents of other religions.” Id. at 204.
44.
Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in
Christianity and Islam 47 (1993).
45.
See infra Part III.A.
46.
Enduring theoretical disagreements regarding the relationship between and interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the First Amendment illustrate this
dilemma in post-Enlightenment legal theory. As Steven Smith argues, the difficulty today is
that the “widely accepted constraints of modern secular discourse—constraints thought by
many . . . to be entailed by religious freedom itself—impede efforts to justify the venerable
commitments to church-state separation and religious freedom, thus cutting the tradition off
from the roots that have nourished it.” Steven D. Smith, Book Review, Discourse in the Dusk:
The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1869, 1872 (2009) [hereinafter Smith,
Discourse in the Dusk]. This in fact represents a “substantial reversal” from the justifications
for religious liberty advanced during the “classical Enlightenment” or “Age of Reason” in the
18th century. See id. The result is that
the problem of church and state is no longer conceived of in terms of separate (and
divinely ordained) jurisdictions; instead, religion and religious institutions are understood to be subject to the encompassing (and secular) jurisdiction of the state.
Within the contemporary framework, however, it is hard to explain why religion
ought to be treated as a special legal category at all and, consequently, how it should
be treated specially.
Id. at 1873; see also Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 San Diego L.
Rev. 1263, 1297–98 (2004) (explaining that the current public discourse concerning politically controversial ideas gives the impression that “it is permissible to express views about
religion, or Truth, only on the condition that the final decision does not depend on those
views”).
47.
Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 961, 969 (2010) [hereinafter Koppelman, Leiter on Respect]. The
point is that this appears to allow according religion special treatment without favoring religion per se. But, as Koppelman notes, much American case law on religious liberty has
involved religious claims that were not necessarily conscientious. Id. at 965–66; see, e.g., City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (involving a claim by a church to expand its building
in order to hold its increasing congregation); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988) (involving an objection to a proposed logging road that would pass
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But here we meet at least two critical objections. First, why should
persons from different religious traditions (not only within, but especially beyond, Western Christianity) accede to the proposition that
conscience or belief and not religion per se is the proper object of protection and accommodation? Muslims, for example, regard themselves
more as claimed by a religious community they have not chosen. In this
sense, Islamic notions of religious belonging and community, as opposed
to the Lockean notion of religious belief, define for many Muslims a way
of life in which the individual does not own herself.48 This has profound
implications for how the operative meanings of ritual and symbol are understood in different religious traditions and in their interrelationship with
secular presentations of public reason.49 In addition, many non-Western
religious traditions such as Islam do not make the same distinction
between the domains of the secular and the sacred or, as in the case of
Hinduism, hierarchically subsume “the secular under the sacred.”50
through and destroy an ancient worship site sacred to a Native American tribe); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the state of Oregon could prohibit the sacramental use of peyote). Interestingly, the underlying facts of Emp’t Division v. Smith involve
the use of peyote not out of religious conscience, but arising from an interest in exploring
Native American identity or simply interest about the Church. Koppelman, supra, at 966 (citing Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith,
30 Ariz. St. L.J. 953, 959–65, 978–85 (1998)). Indeed, in addressing “whether it is fair to
single out religion for special treatment,” Koppelman concludes that “[i]n that inquiry, conscience turns out not to be an important category.” Koppelman, supra, at 970; see also Andrew
Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 571, 584–
600 (2006) (discussing the benefits and detriments of relying on conscience in determining the
treatment religion should be given).
48.
The result is that “[n]ot all religious beliefs can be redescribed without loss as ‘the
product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful.’ ” Michael J. Sandel, Religious Liberty:
Freedom of Choice or Freedom of Conscience, in Secularism and Its Critics 73, 85 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998); see also Bhiku Parekh, Superior People: The Narrowness of
Liberalism From Mill to Rawls, Times Literary Supplement, Feb. 25, 1994, at 11 (“Millian
liberalism . . . linked diversity to individuality and choice, and valued the former only in so far
as it was grounded in the individualist conception of man. This ruled out several forms of
diversity. It ruled out traditional and customary ways of life, as well as those centred on the
community.”).
49.
As Connolly notes, “[w]ith the emergence of secularism and Protestantism, a symbol, in its dominant valence, becomes the representation of an inner state of belief that
precedes it; and ritual is now understood to be the primitive enactment of beliefs that could
also be displayed through cognitive representation.” Connolly, supra note 34, at 25 (discussing the views of Talal Asad). This understanding overlooks how, for example, “in medieval
Christianity . . . a symbol was bound up with enactment or perfection of inner states and
meanings it also represented; and ritual was practiced as a means of educating and constituting
appropriate dispositions of appraisal and aptitudes of performance.” Id. “Asad draws upon
Mauss’s exploration of habitus as ‘embodied aptitude’ to sharpen the sense of how intersubjective dispositions, instincts, and virtues can be constituted through ritual performance.” Id.
50.
T.N. Madan, Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India 15 (1997). Connolly notes that even in the iconic Democracy in America,
“Tocqueville defends a secularism contained within Christianity, while modern secularists
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Second, why is it that only theistic notions of conscience or belief
are singled out for special treatment?51 One possible response to this objection is to concede that religious belief should not receive special legal
treatment but rather something closer to deep moral conviction is what
should be protected.52 But this fails to explain why religious beliefs are
often treated specially, for example when they are held to be distinctly
53
burdened or under a special legal disability.
In addition to the question of theistic beliefs, Connolly has further
argued that the secular public sphere is in fact “predicated upon a twofold strategy of containment: to secure the public realm as it construes it,
it is almost as important to quarantine certain nontheistic patterns of
generally seek to contain Christianity within the private realm.” Connolly, supra note 34, at
24 (emphasis added).
51.
The main international human rights instruments protect both theistic and nontheistic thought and belief. Thus, both the Human Rights Committee and the European Court
of Human Rights have indicated that the beliefs protected by provisions recognizing the right
to freedom of religion include not only religious beliefs, but, at least, other beliefs of a similar
fundamental character, including atheism and agnosticism. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 3, 17 (1993) (“As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought conscience and
religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention. It is . . . also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.”);
ICCPR General Comment, supra note 39, ¶ 2 (“Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and
atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief.”). As noted by Malcolm Evans, however, “the second sentence of Article 9 only relates to the manifestation of a
religion or belief and not to the manifestation of patterns of thought or conscience, which are
covered by the general right to freedom of expression found in Article 10.” Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe 284 (1997). Further, Article 9
will protect only manifestations that actually express the belief concerned, not every act that is
motivated and influenced by a religion or belief. Evans, supra, at 304–14 (citing Efstratiou v.
Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2347, 2362 (1996); Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No.
7050/75, 8 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 123 (1977)).
52.
For a critical discussion suggesting that there is no good secular justification for
treating religion as a special category, see generally Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 77–117 (1995);
Anthony Ellis, What Is Special About Religion?, 25 L. & Phil. 219 (2006); James W. Nickel,
Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 941 (2005); see also Koppelman,
Leiter on Respect, supra note 47, at 969 (discussing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 at
360 n.12 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring) where a law confining draft exemptions to claimants
who believed in God was held to be discriminatory on the basis of religion on the rationale
that Congress was constitutionally required to show “equal regard for men of nonreligious
conscience”).
53.
Smith, Discourse in the Dusk, supra note 46, at 1904–05. Thus, on the basis of state
neutrality the government cannot promote religion (e.g., by teaching or promoting religious
ideas in public schools or using tax money to help religion) even if a majority of citizens wish
it to do so. Some account then needs to be given as to why religion is sometimes treated as
“special and sometimes not.” For Smith, such an account “would likely require resort to the
sorts of more ultimate beliefs that . . . [under a theory of secular equality] government is forbidden to evaluate or act upon” with the result that “the constraints of modern secular
discourse effectively preclude . . . offering any justification for . . . prescriptions beyond unconvincing appeals to supposedly shared [cultural or traditional] axioms or commitments.” Id.
at 1905.
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thinking and technique as it is to monitor ecclesiastical intrusions into
public life.”54 For both theistic and atheistic beliefs then, the result for
secularism is that
its forgetting or depreciation of an entire register of thoughtimbued intensities in which we participate requires it to misrecognize itself and encourages it to advance dismissive
interpretations of any culture or ethical practice that engages the
55
visceral register of being actively.
b. Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?
Beyond the equation of religion with conscience or belief, the second major transformation in modern discourse on religious freedom has
been the partial and unstable equation of freedom of conscience with
autonomy. Modern liberal theory traditionally connects the case for religious freedom and state neutrality with a liberal conception of the person
as a “free and independent sel[f].”56 Thus, for Michael Sandel “[t]he respect this neutrality commands is not, strictly speaking, respect for
religion, but respect for the self whose religion it is, or respect for the
dignity that consists in the capacity to choose one’s religion freely.”57
This view of religious freedom as freely chosen conscience or belief
has deep and complex roots in the history of Protestantism and, in particular, the paradoxical idea that “conscience was directly bound to obey
and follow God and not men: a theory of the free and at the same time
unfree conscience (as the ‘work of God,’ as Luther had said).”58 Steven
Smith has referred to this as the “conscience tautology” whereby “the
duty to follow conscience is understood to mean, basically, that a person
should do what he believes to be right, which in turn seems equivalent to

54.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 26. Connolly observes that the “visceral register of
intersubjectivity,” which animates the thought of many theologians, also receives attention by
several nonsecular, atheistic thinkers such as Nietzsche. Id. (noting that Nietzsche in The AntiChrist distinguishes between Christian doctrines and practices, infinitely preferring the latter
to the former: “[n]ot a belief but a doing, above all, a not doing of many things, a different
being”). The notion of an “instinctive register of intersubjective judgment” is illustrated by
Tocqueville’s account of “preconscious mores,” which both embody “Christian culture” and
help “to regulate public argumentation.” Id. at 24.
55.
Id. at 29. For a similar critique of secular reason by Pope Benedict XVI (then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger), see infra note 82.
56.
Sandel, supra note 48, at 84. For two recent influential accounts, see Christopher
L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (2007);
Nussbaum, supra note 38. But see Marc O. DeGirolami, No Tears for Creon, 15 Legal Theory 245 (2009) (providing a critique of Nussbaum’s book).
57.
Sandel, supra note 48, at 84.
58.
Rainer Forst, Toleration and Democracy 8 (unpublished paper) (on file with author
and with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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saying that a person should do what he believes he should do.”59 The
proposition of a moral duty to follow one’s conscience is easily and often imperceptibly elided, however, with an overriding commitment to
personal autonomy as a kind of “master value for modern man” that
takes the form of a “Kantian-style injunction to be Enlightened, to ‘think
for yourself,’ to make your own judgments without reliance on external
authorities like tradition or churches or books of scripture.”60 Here again,
however, we meet two critical objections.
First, the elision of freedom of conscience with autonomy fatally
undermines the normative basis for according freedom of conscience
special treatment in the first place. As Smith observes:
In its formative period . . . the commitment to freedom of conscience rested precisely on a belief that people are not
autonomous, but rather are dependent on—and obligated by—a
higher and personal Power. That belief was what justified special
respect for people who were acting not just from the normal
mundane motives, and certainly not as autonomous agents, but
from conscience. Dissolving conscience into autonomy turns
conscience on its head and deprives it of this justification for
special respect.61
In this complex set of moves, the former moral duty to follow one’s conscience is subtly transformed into a new individual right to do whatever
62
a person believes is the right thing to do. As we shall see, the consequences of turning conscience “on its head” in this way have been
profound for the modern understanding of the right to freedom of religion and belief.
Second, what does it mean exactly for a person freely to exercise her
conscience by “thinking for herself”? Is it possible for a person’s exercise of conscientious judgment to reach the conclusion that “what is
right is precisely to follow the counsel of some wiser authority”?63 For
example, whether one has a duty to wear particular religious clothing
will depend on what relevant religious authorities, normative traditions,
or sacred texts have to say on the matter. But once conscience is dissolved into autonomy this possibility appears foreclosed, as the right in

59.
Steven D. Smith, The Phases and Functions of Freedom of Conscience 16 (Univ. of
San Diego Sch. of Law, San Diego Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 10-024, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615625.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 17.
62.
See infra Part III.A.1.
63.
Smith, supra note 59, at 16.
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question is to do what one believes to be right not what some external
authority says is right.64
2. Public Reason and Private Faith
The second dilemma for secularism is how to draw the line between
the two spheres—between private life, where religious faith, identity,
and ritual are to be simultaneously contained and protected; and public
life, where free, rational discourse and argument are similarly to be construed and secured. This two-fold strategy of containment raises an
immediate quandary: what is the source of morality in the public sphere?
If secular morality is indeed “free-standing,” can it come to terms with
the moral sensibilities and sources of morality endorsed by (many) religious persons?
As noted by Connolly, in the public sphere of Euro-Atlantic nationstates the logic of secularism is thus assailed from one side as being
“abstract” and “empty,” and from another as being “hypocritical.”
“Abstract because the pale, secular image of the nation is drained of
dense, palpable, living examples that give it vitality; hypocritical because
it secretly draws cultural sustenance from the ‘private faith’ of
constituencies who embody the European traditions from which
Christian secularism emerged.”65
64.
The ambiguity here is related in a complex way to the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of morality. Even if morality is viewed as located “in us” in the
form of “conscience” (as opposed to some external independent order), this can still be an
objectivist view of morality because “it would insist that our nature or telos are somehow
natural and given: they are what they are independent of our (possibly mistaken) opinions
about them.” Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience 9 (Univ. of San Diego Sch.
of Law, San Diego Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 05-02, 2004), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=590944. Given human fallibility, the exercise of conscientious judgment
may then indeed suggest that the best way to determine what is morally required of us is to
defer to or follow the counsel of some more learned authority. Conversely, if one holds a subjectivist view of morality, which holds that what is morally obligatory for me “does not come
from some outside source or inner essential nature that imposes rules on me with or without
my consent” but rather is the “result of my own attitudes or prescriptions or self-legislation,”
then on this view of the “autonomous subject,” reliance on any external authority will be by
definition suspect. Id. at 10. Thinking for yourself in this sense means that “[t]here is no place
for others to tell [you] what morality requires, nor has anyone the authority to do so—not
[your] neighbors, not the magistrates and their laws, not even those who speak in the name of
God.” J.B. Schneewind, Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral
Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Kant 309, 310 (Paul Guyer ed., 1992), cited
in Smith, supra, at 16 n.20. For discussion of this distinction in the context of Article 9 jurisprudence, see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
65.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 91. Noting Tocqueville’s observations that “[i]n the
United States it is not only mores that are controlled by religion, but its sway extends over
reason” and that “Christianity reigns without obstacles, by universal consent,” id. at 24 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 292 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1851)), Connolly suggests that one “might read this to say that
while politics is located in a secular realm, that realm remains safe for Christianity as long as
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These criticisms underpin the two challenges to the notion of a secular public sphere today. One challenge is advanced by Christian critics
who question the purported neutrality of what they regard to be a form of
unjustifiable secular establishment. They do so on the basis of both a
majoritarian democratic argument and a collective claim of right, in other words, the right of a people to (national) self-determination.66 Why,
they ask, should the religion of the majority of the population not be present and visible in the public square? Why, indeed, should Christianity
not be celebrated in national life? Why should Christians not have the
right to raise their children and live their lives in a public culture that
both recognizes and reflects Christian values and mores?67
A second kind of challenge is advanced by Muslim and other religious minority communities. Here the objection is not to the presence or
recognition of Christian values, symbols, or practices in the public
sphere. Rather, the objection is to the exclusion or restriction of Islamic
manifestations of religion or belief on the basis of what is seen as interpretations of norms which appear ineluctably grounded in Christian or
post-Christian conceptions of what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity.68
3. The Authority of Public Reason
This leads to the third and arguably most intractable dilemma for
secularism: the question of how to secure secular authority in the public
sphere. This is in effect the story of the Enlightenment—the quest to
place reliance on reason in order to give universal moral philosophy

the unconscious mores that organize public reason, morality, and politics are Christian.” Connolly, supra note 34, at 24. “This is so because the instinctive register of intersubjective
judgment to which Tocqueville appeals both embodies Christian culture and helps to regulate
public argumentation.” Id. (emphasis added).
66.
For discussion on this point, see Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 12–13
(2008) [hereinafter Danchin, Suspect Symbols] (noting that the nation-state itself “embodies
the recognition that there is a morally significant connection between human freedom and a
collective cultural life” and that “[n]ational self-determination is thus a ‘cultural right’ in the
sense that national, cultural, and religious communities seek and require not private but ‘public spheres’ of their own in order to flourish and, ultimately, to survive”).
67.
But see, e.g., Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations 6 (2008) (noting that this drive to (re)establish Christianity in the
public sphere is diminished to the extent that Christian values and traditions are already inscribed in the “prediscursive dispositions” and cultural fabric of the society).
68.
See, e.g., Asad, Formations of the Secular, supra note 21, at 175 (“[In relation
to Muslim communities in France] [t]he crucial difference between the ‘majority’ and the
‘minorities’ is . . . that the majority effectively claims the French state as its national state. In
other words, to the extent that ‘France’ embodies the Jacobin narrative, it essentially represents the Christian and post-Christian citizens who are constituted by it.”).
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primacy over ecclesiastical theology.69 This project is usually traced to
the eighteenth century thought of Immanuel Kant. In positing that
freedom consists in the acceptance of what reason dictates as duty, Kant
made three critical philosophical moves. First, he elevated a generic
Christianity (“rational religion”) above sectarian faith, anchoring it in a
“metaphysic of the supersensible” that ostensibly binds moral agents
simply in virtue of their rationality.70 Second, in order to secure the
authority of moral philosophy over theology, Kant reduced moral
71
judgment to practical reason alone. And third, while he retained the
“command model of morality of Augustinian Christianity,” in doing so
Kant shifted “the proximate point of command from the Christian God
to the moral subject itself.”72
69.
The modern drive to secure the authority of secular reason in the public sphere has
both a visceral and political sense; visceral in reiterating the “Christian and Kantian demands
to occupy the authoritative place of public discourse,” and political in response to the fear that
a “non-Kantian, religiously pluralized world would fall into either disorder or religious tyranny if its participants did not endorse a single standard of rational authority, regardless of the
extent to which such a standard can in fact be secured transcendentally.” Connolly, supra
note 34, at 38–39; see also Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism:
Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis 18 (1983) (“[For modern philosophy,] [t]he specter
that hovers in the background of this journey is not just radical epistemological skepticism but
the dread of madness and chaos where nothing is fixed, where we can neither touch bottom
nor support ourselves on the surface.”).
70.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 33. Moral obligation (“morality as law”) is drawn
from the “supersensible realm” by practical reason and is thus “anchored only in the ‘apodictic’ recognition by ordinary human beings of its binding authority.” Id. at 31. The purity of
practical reason is assured only if “it is uncontaminated by desire or inclination.” William E.
Connolly, A Critique of Pure Politics, 23:5 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 1, 3 (1997). Thus, “everything must be done to protect the moral will from such contamination” as “the motivation to
duty becomes uncertain when it is infiltrated by sensible desire, and what counts as duty becomes culturally variable when inclination is allowed to enter into its determination.” Id.
71.
In this move, “rational religion” is anchored “in the law of morality rather than
[morality anchored] in ecclesiastical faith.” Connolly, supra note 34, at 31.
For unless the supersensible (the thought of which is essential to anything called religion) is anchored in determinate concepts of reason, such as those of morality,
fantasy inevitably gets lost in the transcendent, where religious matters are concerned . . . and there is no longer any public touchstone of truth.
Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties 81 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1979), quoted
in Connolly, supra note 34, at 31.
72.
This means that
Kant’s rational religion still shares much structurally with the “dogmatic” ecclesiology it seeks to displace. First it places singular conceptions of reason and
command morality above question. Second, it sets up (Kantian) philosophy as the
highest potential authority in adjudicating questions in these two domains and in
guiding the people toward eventual enlightenment. Third, it defines the greatest
danger to public morality as sectarianism within Christianity. Fourth, in the process
of defrocking ecclesiastical theology and crowning philosophy as judge in the last
instance, it also delegitimates a place for several non-Kantian, nontheistic perspectives in public life.
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The challenge in post-Kantian philosophical thought has been to secure the achievement of the “Kantian effect” while disavowing any
73
reliance upon a “metaphysic of the supersensible.” But, again, such efforts remain haunted by the twin charges of abstraction (emptiness) and
hypocrisy. In relation to the former, modern secularists are said to invoke
“authoritative conceptions of thinking, reason and morality that draw
them perilously close to the Kantian metaphysic of the supersensible.” In
relation to the latter, the supposedly apodictic recognition of Kantian
morality simply in virtue of a shared or universal rationality is seen instead as merely a “secondary formation reflecting the predominant
Christian culture in which it is set.”74
B. Rethinking the Secular
These three dilemmas are increasingly recognized today, especially
as new identities seek public recognition in Western nation-states and the
social and political need to find new forms of modus vivendi between
diverse groups in public life accelerates. This is causing legal and political theorists to make two course corrections. First, in acknowledging the
limits of reason and rational discourse and recognizing that any account
of the public sphere will include contestable normative assumptions; and
second, in acknowledging the extent to which extant secular philosophies already enfold specific cultural and contingent elements within
them.75
Consider, for example, Jürgen Habermas, the leading exponent of
post-Kantian philosophical history for whom Kant’s metaphysics of
noumenal community devolves into a politics of liberal democratic deliberation in the public sphere. As noted by Connolly, “Habermas now
acknowledges more actively the role of sensibility in reflection and the
Connolly, supra note 34, at 32.
73.
Id. at 33; see also Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations
of Kant’s Practical Philosophy chs. 1–2 (1989) (asking how any conception of reason has
standing to judge the limits and competence of reason itself and how, if reason cannot in fact
be judged, appeals to reason gain any authority). Rawls’s notion of “political not metaphysical” is a useful illustration of this move. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223 (1985).
74.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 33. If these critiques are correct, then of course the
same objections that Kant levied against the dogmatism and arbitrariness of ecclesiastical
authority can be levied equally against his account of morality as law.
75.
See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, The Relevance of Locke's Religious Arguments for
Toleration, 33 Pol. Theory 678, 678 (2005) (discussing the “role that religious arguments
can play in justifying liberal political principles”); Jeremy Waldron, Two-Way Translation: The
Ethics of Engaging with Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of
Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper No. 10-84, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708113 (considering the role of religious argument and insights in ethical discourse in the public sphere).
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role of contingency in the formation of sensibility.”76 In 2006, Habermas
surprised his critics and admirers alike with the following statement regarding the nature and origins of egalitarian universalism:
Christianity has functioned for the normative self-understanding
of modernity as more than a mere precursor or a catalyst. Egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and
social solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, of the individual morality of conscience, human rights,
and democracy, is the direct heir to the Judaic ethic of justice
and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical appropriation
and reinterpretation. To this day, there is no alternative to it. And
in the light of the current challenges of a postnational constellation, we continue to draw on the substance of this heritage.
Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.77
Once we acknowledge that “secularism is a political settlement rather than an uncontestable dictate of public discourse itself,” and we
admit that any ideal of rational agreement in the public sphere is both
inherently problematic and necessarily incorporates visceral and contingent elements within thinking and discourse, then space opens up for
rethinking the secular insistence on leaving controversial religious and
metaphysical judgments out of the public sphere.78
Again, we see this in the recent work of Habermas, who has now advanced the notion of a “post-secular” society in which the relation of
mutual dependence between faith and knowledge and between religious
and secular citizens is more openly acknowledged and engaged.79 In this
76.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 38.
77.
Jürgen Habermas, A Conversation About God and the World, in Time of Transitions 149, 150–51 (2006). As Connolly thus observes,
metaphysical abstinence increases the pressure on secularists to pretend that actually operative reason . . . is sufficient to the issues at hand, even in the face of their
own insights into how cultural specificities, contingent elements, and artificial closures help to set operative conditions for actual practices of discourse and
judgment.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 37.
78.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 36 (emphasis added); see also Elizabeth Shakman
Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, 10 Eur. J. Int’l Rel.
235, 237 (2004) (arguing that “secularism arrogates to itself the right to define the role of
religion in politics” and in doing so it not only “shuts down important debates about the moral
bases of public order and incites a backlash against its hegemonic aspirations,” but also “operates unaware of the contingency of its assumptions and the consequences of its universalizing
tendencies”).
79.
I believe a similar evolution can be seen in the progression of Rawlsian philosophical thought. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 124, 250, 302 (1971) (defending the
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conception, one of the presuppositions of the secular state is that democratic majority decisions always depend on the prior ethical convictions of
their citizens and encompass moral stances that stem from pre-political
sources such as religious traditions and ways of life.80 Integral to Habermas’s shift in position is the recognition that Kant
construes reason too broadly when he integrates the postulates
of religious faith into its practical dimension. The justification of
morality and that of the existence of God are fundamentally separate issues for Habermas . . . . Hence philosophy must
81
understand religion in the end as something external to it.
In a parallel fashion, but from an opposing perspective, Pope Benedict similarly indicts Kant’s philosophy of religion and self-limited
account of practical reason, although unsurprisingly reaching different
conclusions as to the proper relation of faith and reason.82 Most of the
priority of liberty over other values by advancing the “Greatest Equal Liberty Principle,” according to which each individual has the most extensive liberty subject to others having the
same, restrictable only for the sake of liberty); John Rawls, Political Liberalism xxi
(1993) (replacing the idea of the most extensive system of liberty with an account of the “basic liberties” and seeking to justify a strictly political conception of justice in contrast to a
moral doctrine of justice general in scope); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 65 (1999)
(advancing an even more minimalist account of “special class of urgent rights” and the need
for toleration of “non-liberal but decent societies” in the more religiously and culturally diverse conditions of international law).
80.
Michael Reder & Josef Schmidt, Habermas and Religion, in An Awareness of
What Is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age 1, 7 (Ciaran Cronin trans.,
Polity Press, 2010). But cf. Nadia Urbinati, Laïcité in Reverse: Mono-Religious Democracies
and the Issue of Religion in the Public Sphere, 17 Constellations 4, 5 (2010) (arguing,
contrary to Habermas’s conception of a post-secular democratic society in which religious
citizens have a right to participate in public discourse in accordance with their own principles
and convictions, that “[i]n matters that have a direct impact on the individual freedom of religion and social peace such as the presence of religion in the public sphere, political theorists
should pay close attention to the ethical context and the historical tradition of a given society
without deducing practical conclusions from an ideal conception of democracy” on the basis
that “a political practice that is liberal in a religious pluralistic environment may turn to be
anti-liberal in a mono-religious society [such as Italy]”).
81.
Reder & Schmidt, supra note 80, at 8 (emphasis added). The key move is made by
Habermas in a 2004 essay. See Jürgen Habermas, The Boundary Between Faith and Knowledge: On the Reception and Contemporary Importance of Kant’s Philosophy of Religion, in
Between Naturalism and Religion 209, 210 (Polity Press, 2008) (2005) (“Kant’s selfcriticism of reason was aimed both at the stance adopted by theoretical reason toward the
metaphysical tradition and at the stance of practical reason toward Christian doctrine. Philosophical thought proceeds from transcendental self-reflection both as postmetaphysical and as
post-Christian.”). Again, the dilemma for Kant is that he treats religion as both a heritage (“the
source of a morality that satisfies the standards of reason”) and as an opponent (“an obscure
refuge to be cleansed of obscurantism and zealotry by philosophy”). Id. at 227.
82.
According to Pope Benedict XVI, the idea that metaphysics was a “premise derived
from another source” led to Kant’s statement “that he needed to set thinking aside in order to
make room for faith.” Pope Benedict XVI, Lecture at the University of Regensburg: Faith,
Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
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commentary and protest following his now infamous 2006 Regensburg
lecture has focused on the early critical comments regarding Islam. But
as Asad has observed, what is more intriguing about the lecture
is the way [Benedict] links his discursive attack on Islam to his
critique of European reason. According to Benedict, Islamic theology separates the concept of God from reason (making God
utterly unpredictable, therefore irrational), whereas Christianity
maintains their inseparability in its harmonization of Hellenic ra83
tionality with the status of the divine.
The main target of the lecture is thus “successive waves of deHellenization in European thought—from the Reformation via Kant and
liberal theology to scientific positivism—by which . . . the inner bond
between faith and reason is ruptured. . . . Benedict’s critique is . . . aimed
. . . at reaffirming the identification of reason with divinity”84 and at un85
settling the modern understanding of the Enlightenment. Indeed, for
Benedict, the “Enlightenment is of Christian origin and it is no accident
that it was born precisely and exclusively in the realm of the Christian
faith.”86
Both Habermas and Benedict see a close connection between Europe’s secular traditions and Christianity. What is striking, and curious,
about this position is the perfect correlation it imagines between secular
modernity on the one hand and Europe as a unique Christian civilizational nomos on the other—Europe as simultaneously universal and
exceptional. As Charles Hirschkind observes, this argument rests on a
double maneuver. On the one hand, it “naturalizes one particular form of

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html. The result was that Kant’s modern selflimitation of reason “anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality
as a whole.” Id. Modern thought is thus left in the position “that only positivistic reason and
the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid.” Id. The difficulty, however, is that
the “world’s profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions.” Id. Such a conception of reason
has two fatal disabilities underlying its rationality. First, it is “deaf to the divine,” and having
relegated religion into the “realm of subcultures,” it is incapable of “entering into the dialogue
of cultures.” Second, “with its intrinsically Platonic element, [it] bears within itself a question
which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology.” Id.
83.
Talal Asad, Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism, in Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech 20, 52 (Talal Asad et al. eds., 2009).
84.
Id.
85.
See Joseph Ratzinger, Europe: Today and Tomorrow 93–96 (2004).
86.
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Lecture in Acceptance of the St. Benedict Award: Christianity: “The Religion According to Reason” (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.zenit.org/
article-13705?1=english.

DANCHIN FTP 1_C.DOC

Summer 2011]

7/8/2011 9:24:23 AM

Islam in the Secular Nomos

689

religious expression as the end point of religion’s logical development;”87
on the other, it asserts that “Christian heritage is essential to the civiliza88
tional identity of Europe.” For scholars such as Marcel Gauchet and
Charles Taylor, this close intertwining of Christianity with secular modernity does not cause any sort of theoretical complication.89 Rather, it
confirms Christianity’s unique ability to transcend its own particularity
and sees the inexorable rise of modern liberal political orders as a signal
achievement of Latin Christendom. The result, as Hirschkind argues, is
that
[t]he incorporation of what had been modernity’s other—
religion—into its very fabric does not decenter the conceptual
edifice of European modernity in any way that might allow a reconsideration of Europe’s religious minorities, but on the
contrary redoubles it, deepening the fundamental otherness of
those who cannot inhabit its Christian genealogy. Both secular
politics and private belief emerge as the inheritors of the arc of
religion returning to itself.90
This notion of Christianity as at once foundational to modernity and exceptional as a collective identity is both circular and self-reinforcing; the
former defining the universal in terms of a particular religious tradition
and its encounters with its others, the latter defining the particular in
terms of a conception of the universal—religion in its true form. Any
non-Christian or non-Western religion such as Islam which deviates
from this notion of religion as private belief and subjective experience
thus faces a double charge: not only is it a threat to the secular political
order but it is also not religion in its true, modern form.91
87.
Charles Hirschkind, Religious Difference and Democratic Pluralism: Some Recent
Debates and Frameworks, 44 Temenos 123, 126 (2008) (noting also that on this argument “it
turns out that the modern concept of religion as private belief conforms to religion in its essence” and that a “certain post-Reformation understanding of Christianity is valorized as true
religion in its undistorted form, while all other religious traditions and forms of religiosity are
recognized as incompatible with modernity, lacking all the doctrinal resources that would
enable them to accede to the modern”).
88.
Id. at 69 (observing that proposals to recognize the “Christian roots of Europe” in
the Constitution of the European Union occurred at precisely the moment debates regarding
the presence of Muslims in Europe were intensifying).
89.
See Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political
History of Religion 3–6 (Oscar Burge trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (1985); Charles
Taylor, A Secular Age 15, 20–21 (2007).
90.
Hirschkind, supra note 87, at 126. Hirschkind further notes that “Muslims whose
religious practices make claims on public life are [thus] not merely a threat to the necessarily
secular foundation of a pluralist democratic society; their claims also distort religion’s essential nature.” Id. at 126–27.
91.
Hirschkind argues that we can see this kind of double-move in Slavoj Žižek’s characterization of Christianity as the “religion of modernity.” Id. at 127; see also Slavoj Žižek,
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C. Between Rationality and Reason
What conclusions can we draw from these interrelated dilemmas for
secularism and the theoretical shifts we see underway in competing
secular and religious conceptions of liberal modernity? In particular,
what implications arise for our understanding of the premises and evolution of the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights?
The central thesis of this Article is that the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion in Article 9 encompasses within it both
of these rationalist and dialogic elements.92 As a matter of legal and political philosophy, the status of Article 9 as a fundamental right rests on
its purportedly rational, objective, and neutral character, and its grounding in “free-standing” secular reason. And yet, as we have seen, the
philosophical concept of right is itself in part a reconstruction of “the
categorical ought of the divine imperatives in discursive terms” and, at
the same time, deeply indebted to and grounded in the history and cultural dimensions of Western Christianity.
We need to pay careful attention then to how the Court imagines and
constructs concepts such as “secularism,” “equality,” and “freedom.” We
need also to be sensitive to the possibility that a rationalist mode of justification may in fact jeopardize the freedom of religion and belief of
minority (especially non-Western) religious groups by tacitly subsuming
or incorporating majority cultural norms (whether secular or religious)
into the meaning and scope of Article 9. This is precisely the contamination of practical reason by “sensible desire or inclination” that makes
what counts as duty “culturally variable” and against which the notion of
“right” was intended to be the solution in the first place.
The paradox is that conventions such as the ECHR aim to “create
space for a non-political normativity in the form of human rights that
would be opposable to the politics of States but that is undermined by
the experience that what rights mean, and how they are applied, can only
be determined by the politics of States.”93 Once we abandon the notion
On Belief 150 (2001). On this view, the threat posed to the modern secular political order is
not seen as coming from “religion” per se, which is “now understood as one of Europe’s
greatest moral assets,” but rather “fundamentalism[,] namely, those traditions of religious
practice that fail to accede to the universality of post-theistic Christianity and therefore sit
uncomfortably with the liberal sensibilities of modern Europeans,” while correspondingly,
Muslims within Europe are accused, “echoing Kant, of failing to attain adulthood.” Hirschkind, supra note 87, at 128.
92.
See infra Part III.A.
93.
Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights, Politics, and Love, XIII Finnish Y.B. Int’l L.
79, 79 (2002). For Koskenniemi, this means realizing that “rights defer to politics in the context of professional practice” and application in at least four ways: (1) “field constitution” (the
process by which different areas of social life “come[] to be characterised in terms of rights”);
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that rights exist in some sense above or outside of politics and ideology,
once we see them not as a condition or limit on politics in an objectively
ascertainable moral order but rather as an effect or outcome of the politics and history of a particular nomian sphere, what implications follow?
Here we need to recognize the dialogic element already internal to
rights discourse and the extent to which existing forms and interpretations of rights both distance themselves from and enfold within them the
values and premises of (particular) religious traditions. We thus need to
pay careful attention to the constantly shifting forms of accommodation
and negotiated settlements that animate the praxis of rights in public life.
In the place of a pure morality of law or “ideal of a consensus between
rational agents,” we might imagine instead an ethically sensitive “ethos
of engagement between a plurality of constituencies inhabiting the same
territory and honoring different moral sources.”94 A central question in
the analysis that follows is what recognition of such an ethic of cultivation might mean for the attitude of the European Court of Human Rights
to interpretive questions under Article 9, for example, as regards the
scope and application of terms such as “necessary in a democratic society” and “margin of appreciation.”
In critiquing how human rights law itself constructs and imagines
the category of religion and the right to religious freedom according to
certain distinctive conceptions of public reason and individual freedom, I
have argued previously that considerations such as these require us to
move beyond classical liberalism toward value-pluralist approaches to
rights.95 The central features of value pluralism are its antimonistic position as an ethical theory, its view that conflicts of values are an intrinsic
part of human life and that there is no single right answer in choosing
between them, and that conflicts between entire ways of life suggest that
not only individuals but also communities may be the principal bearers
of rights (and duties) in pluralist political orders.96 If correct, this has
profound implications for our understanding of religious freedom and
liberal toleration in international law.
(2) “indeterminacy” (rights have “no meaning independent from the way [they are] interpreted
by [a] relevant authority” in a relevant context); (3) “right-exception” (“rights always come
with exceptions while the scope or conditions for the application of the exception” are determined by choices which ultimately rely on “alternative conceptions of good society”); and (4)
“conflicts of rights” (in any conflict, the opposing sides will describe their claims in terms of
rights). Id. at 82–85.
94.
Connolly, supra note 34, at 35–36.
95.
See Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra note 66, at 59–61; Peter G. Danchin, Of
Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law,
49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 249 (2008) [hereinafter Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes].
96.
While the formal structure of international human rights law reflects this reality by
recognizing norms of self-determination and minority rights, in general these collective rights
have been undertheorized in the literature on religious freedom.
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II. Religious Freedom in ECHR Jurisprudence
Part I explored competing critiques of secularism, reason, and public
space. In Part II, we now turn to the European Court of Human Rights’
Article 9 jurisprudence to consider the ways in which these rationalist
and dialogic elements have functioned in the Court’s reasoning in cases
involving Islam and the claims of Muslim communities and individuals
(Section C).97 For comparative purposes, it is helpful first to set out
briefly two early lines of cases that accorded a relatively high degree of
protection to freedom of religion and belief, at least in relation to the
claims of majority religious groups. These cases involved the rights of
religious minorities (Section A) and the right to be free from injury to
religious feelings (Section B). It should be noted that each of these lines
of cases involved predominantly Christian groups—Catholic, Protestant,
Eastern Orthodox, and Jehovah’s Witness.
A. The Rights of Religious Minorities
The Court’s first Article 9 decision was Kokkinakis v. Greece,98 in
which Greece prosecuted a Jehovah’s Witness for proselytism directed
toward a member of the dominant religion, Christian Eastern Orthodoxy.
In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that a state may legitimately consider it
necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct,
including the imparting of ideas and information—in this case proselytism—judged incompatible with the respect for the freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion of others. While the application of the Greek
proselytism law in this case was held to be unacceptable, the Court upheld the facial validity of the law and accepted that at least certain forms
of proselytism could be made criminal.99 The case is thus known for the
97.
What follows is a partial and selective discussion of certain aspects of the cases
decided under Article 9 since 1994 as they pertain to the themes discussed in Part I.
98.
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1993).
99.
Id. at 21. For a detailed discussion and a critique of the Court’s decision in Kokkinakis, see Peter Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in Protecting the Human
Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe 192, 200–10 (Peter G. Danchin &
Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 2002). Other early cases involving the rights of minority religions
include: Manoussakis v. Greece, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346 (accepting the legitimacy of the
Greek government’s regulation of religious practice in requiring explicit civil authorization to
open a place of public worship, but finding a violation of Article 9 on the basis of factual evidence that Greece had used its laws to impose rigid or prohibitive conditions on the practice of
religious beliefs by certain non-Orthodox movements); Larissis v. Greece, 1998-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 362 (upholding the criminal conviction of officers of the Pentecostal faith in the Greek
air force for proselytizing subordinates). The Court has also upheld the compulsory participation of Jehovah’s Witness students in school parades commemorating war as not violating
their or their parents’ religious freedom. Efstratiou v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2347,
2362; Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2312. For two less well-known early cases
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Court’s elliptical proper versus improper proselytism distinction, which I
have discussed at length elsewhere.100
What we can see already in Kokkinakis are the early signs of various
normative difficulties in the Court’s approach to Article 9. First, the case
involved a conflict not simply between free speech and freedom of religion, but a conflict internal to the right to religious freedom itself; in
other words, both sides in the dispute advanced their claims on the basis,
inter alia, of freedom of religion and belief. Second, the case raised the
question—later to be so controversial—of the scope of the right to have
or maintain a religion and the right to be “free from injury to religious
feelings.”101 Finally, the case raised for consideration the paradigmatic
issue of the background relationship between a majority national group,
defined in part by an established or dominant religious tradition, and a
new or unpopular religious minority.
B. Freedom from Injury to Religious Feelings
The second of these difficulties became apparent in two subsequent
cases in the mid-1990s in which the Court upheld two state bans on films
deemed offensive to Christian sensibilities. In 1994 in Otto-PremingerInstitut v. Austria, the Austrian government defended seizure of a film on
the basis that it constituted an attack on the Christian religion, and Roman Catholicism in particular, stressing the role of religion in the
everyday life of the people of Tyrol—which was “as high as 87%”
Catholic.102 On this basis, the government’s main argument was that there
was a “pressing social need for the preservation of religious peace” and a
103
necessity “to protect public order.” The Court concurred stating that it
cannot disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the
religion of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing
the film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace
in that region and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and
104
offensive manner.
involving state interference in the organizational leadership of Muslim communities, see Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 118 (finding an Article 9 violation); Serif v.
Greece, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (finding an Article 9 violation). For an early case involving
Jewish communities in France, see Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 231 (upholding French authorities’ refusal to grant approval for access to slaughterhouses to perform ritual slaughter in accordance with ultraorthodox religious prescriptions).
100.
See Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes, supra note 95, at 273.
101.
Id. at 272.
102.
Otto-Preminger-Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 20 (1994).
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 21.
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Citing its earlier judgment in Kokkinakis, the Court then explained how
certain forms of “gratuitous offense” might amount to a violation of an
adherent’s right to freedom of religion under Article 9:
Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a
religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial
by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by
others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in
which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a
matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably
its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right
guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and
doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to
inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them. . . . The respect for the religious
feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 can legitimately
be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals of
objects of religious veneration; and such portrayals can be regarded as malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which
must also be a feature of democratic society.105
As noted in the Introduction, two years later in Wingrove v. United
Kingdom, the Court upheld the British government’s refusal to permit
circulation of the film Visions of Ecstasy found to be offensive to Chris106
tian sensibilities. While the Court made clear its disapproval of British
107
blasphemy laws, it held that it was within Britain’s margin of appreciation to restrict freedom of expression under Article 10 because the
government had the legitimate aim “to protect ‘the rights of others’, and
more specifically to provide protection against seriously offensive at-

105.
Id. at 18. On this basis, the Court found that the applicant could be required “to
avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights.” Id. at 19; cf. id. at 24 (Palm et al., JJ., dissenting) (opposing the
idea that the right to freedom of religion includes the right to be free from injury to religious
feelings but agreeing with the majority that “the democratic character of a society will be
affected if violent and abusive attacks on the reputation of a religious group are allowed . . .
[and thus] it must also be accepted that it may be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to set
limits to the public expression of such criticism or abuse”).
106.
Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937 (1996).
107.
Id. at 1956 (“[I]t is not for the European Court to rule in abstracto as to the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention. . . . The uncontested fact that the law of
blasphemy does not treat on an equal footing the different religions practised in the United
Kingdom does not detract from the legitimacy of the aim pursued in the present context.”).
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tacks on matters regarded as sacred by Christians.”108 The Court further
stated that this aim “is also fully consonant with the aim of the protec109
tions afforded by Article 9 to religious freedom.”
Unsurprisingly, these decisions have been criticized, inter alia, for
accommodating religious sensibilities at the expense of freedom of expression.110 But what is most relevant for present purposes is how the
Court uses the twin conceptual categories of margin of appreciation and
public order on the one hand, and the rights and freedoms of others on
the other, in ways which give priority to the values of the majority religious culture.111
This reflects the controlling paradox of the liberal project: “[T]o pre112
serve freedom, order must be created to restrict it.” The difficulty, as
acutely observed by Agrama, is that while “on the one hand, everyone is
‘equal before the law,’ [and has equal rights] . . . on the other hand, the
aim of the law is to create and maintain public order—an aim that necessarily turns upon the concerns and attitudes of its majority population.”113
Thus, religions well-established within a state, either because they are an
official religion or have a large number of adherents, are more likely to
have their core doctrines recognized as manifestations of religious belief.114 Given the dangers of this approach for a liberal theory of human
108.
Id. at 1957.
109.
Id. at 1955. Furthermore, “[a] wider margin of appreciation is generally available to
the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion.” Id.
at 1958.
110.
See, e.g., Peter W. Edge, The European Court of Human Rights and Religious
Rights, 47 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 680, 682–83 (1998) (arguing that “[i]t is open to question
whether an entirely passive state, which is dependent upon the inaction of others rather than
the inaction of the believer, properly constitutes a manifestation of those beliefs” and that the
case “should be treated with caution as an authority on the extent of Article 9 protection”); see
also George Letsas, Is There a Right Not to Be Offended in One’s Religious Beliefs?, in Law,
State and Religion in the New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (Lorenzo Zucca ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2011) (advancing a conception “of democracy and liberal
equality that shows why there is no right not to be insulted in one’s religious beliefs in public
space”).
111.
On the interrelated issues of public order and the rights of others, see infra Part III.
112.
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 71 (Cambridge University Press, reissued with new epilogue,
2005) (1989) (“The fundamental problem of the liberal vision is how to cope with what seem
like mutually opposing demands for individual freedom and social order.”).
113.
Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?, in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech 64, 85–86
(Townsend Ctr. For the Humanities, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley ed., 2009) (citing Hussein Ali
Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious State?, 52
Comp. Stud. in Soc’y & Hist. 495, 506 (2010)).
114.
See Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes, supra note 95, at 287 (“[I]t is apparent
that the court has generally construed individual rights in terms of the collective good of the
majority as against that of minority religious groups. This approach does not prevent minority
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rights or any regime that privileges individual freedom, the Court has
employed a variety of techniques including the margin of appreciation
and tests of reasonableness or proportionality to mask the partiality and
contestability of its reasoning in determining outcomes.
C. The Claims of Muslim Communities
None of these previous controversies concerned Islam. Let us turn
then to the Court’s third line of cases which deal directly with Islam and
the rights of Muslim communities (both majorities and minorities) to
have and maintain their religious beliefs and traditions. This sequence of
cases begins with Dahlab v. Switzerland115 and extends though the
Court’s decisions in Refah Partisi v. Turkey,116 Șahin v. Turkey,117 and
most recently Dogru v. France.118 Each of these cases (with the exception
of Refah) involved the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public schools
or universities. An important national-level case also relevant to this dis119
cussion is Regina [Begum] v. Denbigh High School in which the
English courts relied extensively (although in different ways) on the
Court’s judgment in Șahin, which in turn relied on its earlier judgment in
Refah.120
In the first case, Dahlab v. Switzerland, a Swiss primary school
teacher converted to Islam and decided to cover her hair at work. The
Swiss Director General of Public Education issued a direction that she
cease wearing religious clothing at school. She refused, challenged the
decision in the Swiss courts, and after losing took her case to the European Court of Human Rights. There, Switzerland argued as a
jurisdictional matter that the case was “manifestly ill-founded” and
should not proceed to the merits. The Court agreed.121
In the second case, Refah, the Grand Chamber upheld a ban on the
largest political party in Turkey, the Welfare Party, on the basis that its
activities violated the constitutional principles of secularism and democreligious groups from freely practicing their beliefs as guaranteed under article 9—at least not
in those ‘private’ spaces of the private sphere such as homes or places of worship . . . . [I]t
[does] mean[] that in cases of conflict, the court will prefer the majority nation’s conception of
the collective good including the limits to individual freedom implied by that conception.”).
115.
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463.
116.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003).
117.
Șahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99 (2007).
118.
Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 179, 182 (2008).
119.
R [Begum] v. Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100.
120.
See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, Headscarves, Extreme Speech, and Democracy 13–14
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.uwo.ca/publiclaw/PublicLaw_
Documents/Headscarves_ExtremE_Speech.pdf.
121.
Carolyn Evans, The ‘Islamic Scarf ’ in the European Court of Human Rights, 7
Melb. J. Int’l. L. 52, 59–60 (2006); see also Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
447, 456–57.
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racy.122 As noted by David Dyzenhaus, the Court in its reasoning endorsed the findings of both the Turkish Constitutional Court and the
majority of the Chamber of the Third Section of the European Court
“that shariah is ‘incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the Convention’ because it is a ‘stable and invariable
religion’ in which principles ‘such as pluralism in the political sphere or
the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place.’ ”123
The Welfare Party was found to have plans to “set up a plurality of
legal systems, leading to discrimination based on religious beliefs,” and
it intended to “apply sharia to the internal or external relations of the
Muslim community within the context of this plurality of legal systems.”
Certain statements of the party’s leaders were said not to rule out the use
of force to achieve these aims.124 Even in the absence of such threats,
however, the Court found that both Shari’ah and “plural religiouslybased legal systems” were—even if democratically adopted—inherently
incompatible with the ECHR and its concomitant notions of democracy
and the rule of law.125 As John Finnis has observed, in taking this line the
Court adopted the concept of “militant democracy”: the notion that a
democracy might find it necessary to sacrifice democratic rights and
freedoms in order to sustain itself.126
A number of judges, however, in both chambers expressed disagreement with these findings. Three of the seven judges in the Chamber

122.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 35 (2003) (“[A]
political party . . . which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed at the destruction of
democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay
claim to the Convention’s protection against penalties imposed on those grounds.”).
123.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 120, at 16 (quoting Refah, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 47).
124.
Refah, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 41.
125.
John Finnis, Endorsing Discrimination Between Faiths: A Case of Extreme
Speech?, in Extreme Speech and Democracy 430, 436 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds.,
2009). The Court held that a regime of plural religious legal orders would run counter to the
ECHR’s guarantees of both equality and the rule of law. Refah, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 42. This
was because it “would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms.” Id.
Since plans to implement shariah “were incompatible with the concept of a ‘democratic society,’ the opportunities open to Refah to implement such a policy made the
danger to democracy ‘more tangible and more immediate.’ Hence, the dissolution of
the party could ‘reasonably be considered to have met a “pressing social need.” ’ ”
Dyzenhaus, supra note 120, at 16 (citing Refah, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 47).
126.
Finnis, supra note 125, at 437; see also Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy,
Legal Pluralism and the Paradox of Self-Determination, 4 Int’l. J. Const. L. 488, 490–91
(2006) (“Informed by a commitment to democratic government, [the Refah framework] reveals the limits and possibilities of subjecting conflicting claims of self-determination to the
rule of law and constitutes a legal site of contestation over the constitutional boundaries of
legal pluralism and militant democracy.”).
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of the Third Section dissented from the majority’s findings of fact,127
while in the Grand Chamber, Judge Kovler entered a separate concurring
opinion rejecting a number of the majority’s findings regarding both Islamic law and the notion of legal pluralism in the context of the
ECHR.128 In a remarkable passage, Judge Kovler indicated his regret that
the majority had missed the opportunity to
analyse in more detail the concept of a plurality of legal systems,
which is linked to that of legal pluralism and is well-established
in ancient and modern legal theory and practice. Not only legal
anthropology but also modern constitutional law accepts that
under certain conditions members of minorities of all kinds may
have more than one type of personal status. Admittedly, this pluralism, which impinges mainly on an individual’s private and
family life, is limited by the requirements of the general interest.
But it is of course more difficult in practice to find a compromise between the interests of the communities concerned and
civil society as a whole than to reject the very idea of such a
129
compromise from the outset.
127.
In their dissent, Judges Fuhrmann, Loucaides, and Bratza state that what is lacking
in the majority’s reasoning is
any compelling or convincing evidence to suggest that the party, whether before or
after entering Government, took any steps to realise political aims which were incompatible with Convention norms, to destroy or undermine the secular society, to
engage in or to encourage acts of violence or religious hatred, or otherwise to pose
a threat to the legal and democratic order in Turkey.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 105 (2002) (Fuhrmann, J.,
dissenting).
128.
Judge Kovler states that he is bothered by some of the Court’s findings because
in places they are unmodulated, especially as regards the extremely sensitive issues
raised by religion and its values. I would prefer an international court to avoid terms
borrowed from politico-ideological discourse, such as “Islamic fundamentalism”
[paragraph 94 of the judgment], “totalitarian movements” [paragraph 99 of the
judgment], “threat to the democratic regime” [paragraph 107 of the judgment], and
so on, whose connotations, in the context of the present case, might be too forceful.
Refah, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 50 (Kovler, J., concurring).
129.
Id. at 50–51 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Judge Kovler further stated that the
notion of legal pluralism is critical to the assessment to be made of Shari’ah which constitutes
the
legal expression of a religion whose traditions go back more than 1,000 years, and
which has its fixed points of reference and its excesses, like any other complex system. In any case legal analysis should not caricature polygamy (a form of family
organisation which exists in societies other than Islamised peoples) by reducing it to
. . . ‘discrimination based on the gender of the parties concerned’ [paragraph 128 of
the judgment].
Id. at 51.
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This passage illuminates the degree to which the reasoning of the majority assumes rather than justifies certain unarticulated liberal premises
regarding the scope and nature of the right to freedom of religion and
belief.130 By holding a priori on the basis of the nondiscrimination principle that such claims to legal pluralism are repressive and threaten
individual freedom, the Court obscures the degree to which these are in
fact competing claims to freedom, autonomy, and self-determination. The
Court’s analysis misconstrues the true nature of the conflict in Turkey,
which, quite apart from questions of liberal rights and freedoms, centers
on the locus of Islam as a source of political legitimacy among different
elite groups in the historical context of Kemalism as a state-building project.131 Patrick Macklem thus concludes that the Court’s conception of
militant democracy in Refah “now authorizes a state to assume a militant
stance toward the exercise of religious freedom that threatens substantive
conceptions of democracy instantiated in its constitutional order.”132
130.
See infra Part III.A.
131.
As suggested by Murat Akan, the Kemalism–Islam opposition is actually a “political dichotomy representing an elite conflict.” Murat Akan, Contextualizing Multiculturalism,
Stud. Comp. Int’l Dev. 57, 71 (2003). Secular elites in Turkey, who seek to preserve the
legacy of Kemal Atatürk in establishing a secular republican nation-state, have traditionally
sought to use and control Islam in utilitarian terms “to bind the majority to the nation-building
project.” Id. Article 24 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution provides that “teaching and education
in religion and morals is conducted under the guidance of the state.” Id. Founded in 1924, the
Ministry of Religious Affairs has the authority to instruct citizens on “correct Islamic practices” in the face of the divergent interpretations and local practices of Islamic sects. Id. at 70.
In this respect, Turkish secularism does not entail a mutually exclusive sphere separate from
Islam. The founding elite made religion subject to the republican state in order both to build a
uniform nation-state and to eliminate religion as a rival autonomous source of legitimacy. In
the 1980s, however, “the monopoly of the Kemalist state elite on capital and political power
was challenged by a rising Islamist elite,” which made a “counter-claim on the very religious
sphere which the republicans have striven to control and monopolize as a source of legitimacy.” Id. at 71. For a contrast of the “assertive secularism” of the Kemalists, who seek to
confine Islam to the private sphere, with the “passive secularism” of the conservative parties
that seek greater public visibility of Islam, see also Ahmet T. Kuru, Passive and Assertive
Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies Toward Religion,
59 World Pol. 568, 582 (2007).
132.
Patrick Macklem, Guarding the Perimeter: Militant Democracy and Religious Freedom in Europe 2 (Apr. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1660649 (“The migration of militant democracy
. . . signals an ominous shift in the way in which the European Court of Human Rights comprehends the relationship between religion and state power. . . . [T]he Court has begun to
reframe religious freedom as a threat to democracy and immunize states from judicial oversight when they take preemptive measures to curb its exercise.”); see also Kevin Boyle,
Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case, 1 Essex Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
1, 3, 12 (2004) (arguing “that the Grand Chamber judgment in the Refah case was unfortunate
and wrong” and noting that “Refah did not challenge democracy as such, but rather sought to
question an ideology imbued in the institutions of the State and enforced by the Turkish military” and on the basis of “such questioning that implicitly challenged the undemocratic
control of the military over Turkish political development . . . it was removed”).
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The Court’s third major decision, Șahin v. Turkey, further illustrates
this complex dialectic between Islam and the secular public sphere. The
case involved a fifth-year medical student at the University of Istanbul
who was denied enrollment on the grounds that she was wearing the Islamic headscarf. The applicant came from a traditional family of
practicing Muslims and regarded it as her religious duty to wear the
headscarf.133 The Court accepted that the regulations at issue interfered
with her right to manifest her religion under Article 9(1) but held that
they constituted a valid limitation under Article 9(2) because, as they
pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the “rights and freedoms of
others” and “public order,” they could be regarded as “necessary in a
democratic society.”134
The “necessity” of the interference was held to be based on two
principles—secularism and equality—that reinforced each other.135 The
Turkish constitutional principle of secularism was held to be necessary
136
for the protection of the democratic system in Turkey. The Court
clearly linked the principle of secularism to the notion of militant democracy from Refah in holding that the Islamic headscarf is a symbol of
political Islam and thus, like in Refah, a “genuine threat to republican
values and civil peace.”137 The principle of gender equality—recognized
in both the Turkish constitution and the ECHR—provided a further justi138
fication.
Unsurprisingly, the decision has been questioned for uncritically endorsing religious intolerance, tacitly relying on a paternalistic and static
conception of gender equality, and advancing an illiberal conception of
religious freedom.139 While Refah was principally concerned with the
133.
Șahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 105–06 (2007).
134.
This was especially the case given the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting
States. Id. at 124–30.
135.
Id. at 127–29.
136.
Viewing the regulations as intended to preserve “pluralism in the university,” the
Court pointed in particular to “extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose
on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious
precepts.” Id. at 128.
137.
Id. at 111.
138.
Id. at 110, 112–13 (discussing the Turkish Constitution); id. at 127, 128–29 (discussing ECHR jurisprudence).
139.
See, e.g., Evans, supra note 121, pt. IV.B–C; Macklem, supra note 132, at 17 (criticizing the Court for giving “Turkey a wide margin of appreciation, permitting it to act in a
preemptive manner against religious extremism where the conduct in question—the wearing
of a head scarf—in no way can be characterized as posing an imminent threat to democracy as
understood by the Court in Refah”). These criticisms were also powerfully expressed in the
dissenting judgment of Judge Tulkens who criticized the majority for refusing to allow Ms.
Șahin to act in accordance with her personal choice on the basis of an essentialized and unexamined set of assumptions regarding the “connection between the ban and sexual equality.”
Șahin, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 143 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
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limits of liberal pluralism, Șahin can be seen to have been concerned
with competing conceptions of secularism in the public sphere.
The fourth case, Dogru v. France, shares many of the same features
regarding secularism and the public sphere as Șahin, but also an important difference. The case involved an eleven-year-old French Muslim
student who refused to remove her headscarf in physical education classes.140 The state secondary school expelled her on the basis of an internal
school rule that while “[d]iscreet signs manifesting the pupil’s . . . religious convictions shall be accepted in the establishment,” all students
must attend physical education classes in “sports clothes.”141 The Court
agreed with the French government’s argument that the purpose of the
restriction “was to adhere to the requirements of secularism in state
schools” noting that the policy was consistent with the jurisprudence of
the Conseil d’Etat.142
Citing both Refah and Șahin, the Court thus held unanimously that
the restriction was justified under Article 9(2) as it was directed towards
a legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic society.143 In explicitly
invoking the margin of appreciation left to states “with regard to the establishment of the delicate relations between the churches and the state,
religious freedom thus recognised and restricted by the requirements of
secularism appears legitimate in the light of the values underpinning the
Convention.”144
140.
Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 179, 182 (2008).
141.
Id. at 186. The rule also prohibited students from wearing “conspicuous signs
which are in themselves of proselytizing or discriminatory effect.” Id. In applying these rules,
the school allowed the applicant to wear the headscarf other than in physical education classes. Id.
142.
Id. at 198. At the request of the Minister for Education, the Conseil d’Etat gave a
ruling on November 27, 1989, on “the compatibility with the principle of secularism of wearing signs at school indicating affiliation to a religious community.” In that ruling, the Court
stated that the freedom to manifest religious beliefs did not extend to displaying
signs of religious affiliation, which, inherently, in the circumstances in which they
are worn, individually or collectively, or conspicuously or as a means of protest,
might constitute a form of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, undermine the dignity or freedom of the pupil or other members of the educational
community, compromise their health or safety, disrupt the conduct of teaching activities and the educational role of the teachers, or, lastly, interfere with order in the
school or the normal functioning of the public service.
Id. at 187.
143.
Id. at 196–200. The Court states that the decision by the French authorities “that the
wearing of a veil, such as the Islamic headscarf, was incompatible with sports classes for reasons of health or safety is not unreasonable.” Id. at 199. The Court offers no reasons for this
conclusion, however, or why less restrictive means are also unacceptable (such as wearing a
hat, as proposed by the applicant) stating that this “falls squarely within the margin of appreciation of the State.” Id. at 200.
144.
Id. at 199.
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The Court’s reasoning invoked the historical evolution of laïcité in
the French Republic with its concomitant notions of the public-private
145
divide and state “neutrality” in strictly secular terms. In this respect,
Dogru reinforces the way in which l’affaire du foulard has been understood to date in France: Islam, as symbolized by the headscarf, whether
viewed through the lens of French nationalism from the left or the right,
is a threat to the secular character of the Republic.146 But there is an important difference here from Șahin. In that case, the struggle was over
the meaning of the public sphere within a single majority nation and religious tradition. Here, the Court’s conception of liberal toleration—that
laïcité requires the state to be neutral, blind, and indifferent to religious
diversity in order to honor the nondiscrimination principle and treat everyone equally—defines neutrality in terms of the “essential” collective
identity of the majority while denying public recognition of the “essential” collective identity of a religious minority.147
In this approach religious diversity is indeed to be respected, but only on terms that conform to the majority’s conception of the good. The
French state’s right to defend its essential or “inviolable” secular personality in this way trumps the right to freedom of religion or belief to the
extent that the latter is interpreted to conflict with the former. This raises
critical questions about the specific meaning of the concept of neutrality
being employed here. As Galeotti has observed: “Before the headscarf
case broke out, no one was even aware of whether religious symbols
were present in school or not. This might suggest that, as the critics of
liberalism have remarked, neutrality is not so neutral after all, and the
secular state not so thoroughly secularized.”148

145.
Article 2 of the 1958 French Constitution states that “France is a Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic, and social. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,
without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.” 1958 Const. art. 2
(Fr.).
146.
As I have argued previously, laïcité defines the collective public identity of the
French nation. The French national personality is embodied in the secular, rational Jacobin
republic founded out of the French Revolution, which denounced religious intolerance and
attacked ecclesiastical power under the banner of “humanity.” This collective personality is the
precondition of French citizenship. The collective narratives that define what it means to “be
French” and the practices that they authorize thus construct French citizens as carriers of a
secular heritage. See Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra note 66, at 21–22.
147.
Given that public schools are the primary means by which French Republican citizenship is to be fostered, the prohibition of all religious symbols is merely a “reaffirmation of
the boundaries of the secularized public sphere against any religious interference.” Anna
Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition 123 (2002). This is not regarded as
intolerance by either the French majority or the Strasbourg Court, but rather as a “limit to
liberal tolerance in order to preserve the neutrality of the public school and the equality of the
students as would-be citizens, beside and beyond any particular memberships.” Id. at 123–24.
148.
Id. at 124.
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Finally, as mentioned above, it is instructive to review briefly the decisions of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Regina [Begum] v.
149
Denbigh High School. This case involved a fourteen-year-old Muslim
girl’s claim to freedom of religion under Article 9 to wear the jilbab to a
coeducational community school in Luton, England.150 The Court of Appeal ruled in her favor holding that Begum had a sincere belief that her
religion required her to wear a jilbab on reaching puberty and that the
school’s rules were not necessary in a democratic society and thus in
151
violation of Article 9. The House of Lords, however, overturned this
decision ruling that even if there had been an interference with Shabina
Begum’s right to manifest her religion under Article 9(1), the school’s
policy constituted a justifiable limitation on that right under Article
9(2).152
In the course of their reasoning, the judges relied extensively on Șahin and, in particular, the European Court of Human Rights’
jurisprudence on the legitimate aims of restricting manifestations of religious belief to ensure “the value of religious harmony and tolerance
between opposing or competing groups and of pluralism and broadmindedness”153 and of “[f]ostering a sense of community and
cohesion.”154 Unlike in Șahin and Dogru, however, the concepts of secularism and republicanism respectively were not what animated the
judgments of the House of Lords. The United Kingdom after all has an
established church and various manifestations of religious belief, and the
wearing of religious clothing are already permitted in the public schools.
Rather, the question before the judges was the limits of toleration and the
need to find and justify a reasonable form of accommodation between
the competing claims and interests at stake.155

149.
R [Begum] v. Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100.
150.
Id. About seventy-nine percent of the students at Denbigh High School were Muslim, and female students were given the option of wearing a shalmar kameeze and headscarf.
Id. at 107–08. Shabina Begum requested to be allowed to wear a jilbab, which would have
more fully concealed the contours of her body. Id. at 109.
151.
Id. at 101.
152.
Each of the Lords presented a separate opinion. For the analysis given by one, see
id. at 132 (Baroness Hale).
153.
Id. at 116 (Lord Bingham).
154.
Id. at 134 (Baroness Hale).
155.
This is most obvious in the judgment of Baroness Hale, which goes so far as to
consider policy reports on women and multiculturalism in Britain. Id. at 132–34 (Baroness
Hale); see also Clemens N. Nathan, The Changing Face of Religion and Human
Rights: A Personal Reflection 103–04 (2009) (suggesting that Begum was not about the
public display of “overtly religious symbols” as in France but rather “the balance to be struck
between the school’s right to determine its school uniform policy within proportionate and
legitimate boundaries and a pupil’s right to assert her choice of clothing beyond the school
uniform options offered to her”).
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For John Finnis, however, the case is an illustration of the “conceptual slackness of human rights law-in-action,” and he has criticized the
156
Lords’ judgments for being “thin, conclusory, and result-oriented.” In
particular, the judges fail to explain “why what was evidently not ‘necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ in at least
two nearby schools was necessary in Denbigh High School.”157 Rather, it
is in Șahin and Refah that the “real premise and thrust of Begum can be
found.”158 This is because the only way to explain how the use of a religious symbol to manifest one’s beliefs can threaten the rights of others is
if it is associated with a “definite and particular kind of religious culture,” one that has some or all of the following features:
[A] disrespect for equality (here the equality of females, especially girls and young women); a denial of immunity from
coercion in religious matters (including matters of apostasy from
that religion or rejection of all religion), the immunity now central to Christian political teaching; a mandating, encouragement,
or permission of intimidation of apostates, backsliders and others; and a treatment of all arenas, educational or political, as in
principle subject to threatening pressure, indeed compulsion, in
the name of religious truths and precepts and of promoting ad159
herence to them.
156.
Finnis, supra note 125, at 433. While Baroness Hale does find “evidence of other
girls’ fear of being pressured,” she concludes from this only that “the school’s policy was ‘a
thoughtful and proportionate response to reconciling the complexities of the situation’ given
‘the social conditions in that school, in that town, and at that time.’ ” Id.
157.
Id. at 431. Finnis notes that the question of necessity under Article 9(2) is distinct from
“the question whether the school made a reasonable judgment about what would ‘best serve’ the
interests of its pupils.” Id. Further, Article 9(2) requires restrictions on manifestations of religious
belief to be in response to a “pressing social need” (as Judge Tulkens emphasized in her dissent
in Șahin) and to be the “least restrictive” means available. Id. at 432.
158.
Id. at 433 (explaining that the premise of Begum can be found in Șahin).
159.
Id. at 435. Finnis summarizes the “contours and grounds” of the Grand Chamber’s
judgment in Șahin as follows:
For the present, they can be summarized by reference to a statement which, on its surface, seems not to discriminate (differentiate) between religions: “when a particular
dress code [is] imposed on individuals by reference to a religion, the religion concerned [is] perceived and presented as a set of values that [are] incompatible with
those of contemporary society.” That incompatibility . . . is elaborated in terms of two
further but related considerations: the equality rights of women; and the rights and
freedoms of all those, whether Muslim, ex-Muslim, or non-Muslim, who choose not
to conform to what some Muslims perceive and present as a religious duty—a right, in
other words, to be free from intimidation or pressure. . . . Measures, such as those in
issue in Șahin, forbidding the Islamic headscarf, “have to be viewed in that context
and constitute a measure intended to achieve the legitimate aim” of protection of
rights and freedoms and public order.
Id. at 434.
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All of this, says Finnis, is what lies just below the surface of the Lords’
terse allusions to the school’s fear of “adverse repercussions” if they allowed the jilbab. Both the House of Lords and European Court of
Human Rights made findings not about all religions, but about a particular religion.160 Once that distinction was made, the Lords in Begum were
able to reject discrimination arguments under Article 14 regarding the
unjustifiability of the jilbab ban on the basis that a pressing social need
was established under Article 9(2) for restricting the relevant particular
161
religious belief in question.
It is not the conservative political conclusions that Finnis draws that
are of interest here,162 but rather the mutually reinforcing relationship he
imagines existing between Christianity and the English constitutional
order and the wider nomos of the European Court of Human Rights more
generally. The differential treatment of Islam and Christianity in ECHR
jurisprudence is justified, in other words, because Islam is a threat to,
whereas Christianity is compatible with, the right to freedom of religion
and belief.
In conclusion, four interrelated themes emerge from the cases involving the claims of Muslim communities. First, in Refah we see the
extent to which Article 9 is premised on a liberal conception of right that
excludes from its scope certain nonsecular notions of the collective good
and collective identity. Second, in Șahin we see the ways in which secularism and neutrality define and discipline the place of religion in the
public sphere. Third, in Dogru we see the place of religious minorities in
secular liberal democracies and the protections to be accorded to them.
And fourth, in Begum we see the effects of the historical and conceptual
relationship between Christianity and the right to religious freedom in
the Western liberal tradition. It is to these underlying theoretical concerns we now turn.

III. Islam in Article 9 Jurisprudence
The three lines of cases discussed in Part II illustrate the basic contours and fault lines in the European Court of Human Rights’ Article 9
160.
For example, the assertion that Shari’ah and “quasi-millet legal pluralism” are
“simply incompatible with the ECHR is equivalent to an assertion of their illegitimacy.” Id. at
436.
161.
Id. at 436–37.
162.
He argues that “[c]onfronted by the grave warnings thus issuing from courts of
great pan-European authority,” citizens in European states may consider “whether it is prudent
. . . to permit any further migratory increase in that population, or even to accept the presence
of immigrant, non-citizen Muslims without deliberating seriously about a possible reversal—
humane and financially compensated for and incentivized—of the inflow. Id. at 439–40.

DANCHIN FTP 1_C.DOC

706

7/8/2011 9:24:23 AM

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 32:663

jurisprudence. As argued in the Introduction, they expose two critical
and deeply entangled domains of contestation: the first concerning the
nature and scope of the right to religious freedom; the second concerning
the place of religion in the public sphere. If we compare the cases in
Parts II.A and II.B, most of which involved claims made by Christian
groups, with the cases in Part II.C, all of which involved claims made by
Muslim communities and individuals, we see an apparent paradox.
In relation to the former, the Court has adopted a mode of reasoning
that we might term “liberal pluralism.” The right to have or maintain a
religious tradition was accorded a wide scope in Kokkinakis and the right
to be free from injury to religious feelings was similarly recognized and
given substantive content in Wingrove and Otto-Preminger. In each case,
the Court’s reasoning pushed the limits of liberal theory by acknowledging the collective dimension of freedom of religion and belief and the
ongoing role and significance of Christianity in the way of life of the
affected communities. More broadly, the fact that many European
states—including Greece and the United Kingdom, the respondent states
in Kokkinakis and Wingrove—have official or established churches has
not apparently been seen to raise existential dangers to secularism, democracy, or the rule of law.163
In relation to the latter cases, however, the Court has adopted a mode
164
of reasoning that we might term “liberal antipluralism.” The scope of
163.
See Alfred Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,” 11 J. Democracy 37, 43 (2000) (“From the viewpoint of empirical democratic practice . . . secularism
and the separation of church and state have no inherent affinity with democracy . . . .”). Even
within a modern European nation-state such as Greece, the Greek Constitution is proclaimed
in the name of the Holy Trinity and affirms that the “dominant religion in Greece is that of the
Christian Eastern Orthodox Church.” Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3, 11
(1993) (quoting 1975 Syntagme [Syn] [Constitution] 3 (Greece)). As François Thual
notes, “Slavic, Greek, Balkan, Caucasian Orthodox Christianity has never known secularism
. . . based on the separation of Church and State.” François Thual, Dans le monde orthodoxe,
la religion sacralise la nation, et la nation protège la religion [In the Orthodox World, Religion Sanctifies the State, and the State Protects Religion], Le Monde (Fr.), Jan. 20, 1998, at 13.
164.
The notion of “liberal antipluralism” is recognized in political theory. See, e.g.,
John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (2000); William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 Ethics 516 (1995) (juxtaposing opposing liberal conceptions of autonomy and
diversity in the context of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); David Owen, Political
Philosophy in a Post-Imperial Voice: James Tully and the Politics of Cultural Recognition, 28
Econ. & Soc’y 520 (1999) (distinguishing two Enlightenment traditions of public reason: one
an abstract and universalizing activity that reflects on historically and culturally situated practices of practical reasoning “from above” and legislates their character and limits; the other
always dependent to some extent on historically and culturally situated practices of practical
reasoning and so the methodological extension of the self-reflective character of such practices). The term is also recognized in international legal theory. See, e.g., Gerry Simpson, Two
Liberalisms, 12 Eur. J. Int’l L. 537 (2001) (juxtaposing historically situated Charter liberalism (diversity) and ahistorical liberal anti-pluralism (autonomy) in the context of relations
between states in international law).
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Article 9 was read narrowly in Refah to exclude claims to legal pluralism
and collective autonomy, and in Dogru and Begum to deny the claims of
Muslim minorities in European nation-states to manifest their religious
beliefs and collective identities. At the same time, both Turkey and
France were accorded wide margins of appreciation in Șahin and Dogru
to limit religious freedom on the grounds of protecting the public order
values of secularism and neutrality. In Refah and Șahin, this was the case
even though the claims had been made democratically and in accordance
with majority will.165
Part III explores this paradox with a view to elucidating the contours
and shape of both the right to freedom of religion and belief and the secular public sphere of the supranational nomos of the Court itself. Section
A discusses the scope of Article 9(1) and argues that certain unarticulated premises underlie the Court’s interpretation of the right to freedom
of religion and belief. Section B turns to the question of limitations on
religious freedom as set out in Article 9(2) and, in particular, how the
Court constructs the notions of “public order” and the “rights and freedoms of others.” Finally, Section C returns to the themes set out in Part I
and analyzes how the Court imagines the connection between secularism
and the notion of a limitation being “necessary in a democratic society”
as that term has developed in Article 9 jurisprudence.
A. The Scope of the Right to Religious Freedom
Article 9(1) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion . . . [including] freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”166 In this
Section, I argue that the Court’s attempts to interpret the claims of a nonWestern and non-Christian religious community within the terms of this
Article reveal both the contingency and contestability of ECHR rights
discourse and the Court’s self-understanding of liberal neutrality itself.
As discussed in Part I, the defining ideas of the liberal state are neutrality and a putative public-private divide. Religion is seen as separated
from the state (“disestablished”) and “privatized”; that is, removed to a
private, intimate sphere. This leaves a “neutral” public sphere that seeks
to maintain its neutrality through rigorous commitment to a scheme of
individual rights. The state may thus have no cultural or religious
165.
See Zehra Ayman & Ellen Knickmeyer, Ban on Head Scarves Voted Out in Turkey,
Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 2008, at A17 (using the 2008 Turkish Parliament vote of 411 to 103
ending the ban on women wearing headscarves at universities as an illustration of majority
support in Turkey for Muslims’ claims to manifest their religious beliefs and collective identity).
166.
ECHR, supra note 6, art. 9, ¶ 1.
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projects, or indeed any collective goals of its own, beyond the protection
of the liberty and security of its citizens.
This view of religion, and religious freedom, imposes significant
constraints on both the individual and the state. The individual must restrain her will according to the dictates of universal reason by
transcending any “distracting sensuous inclinations” and by containing
her religion to the private sphere of conscience or belief. The state, for
its part, must remain “neutral” between all religions and beliefs, and between religion and nonreligion, by both rigorously protecting the
neutrality of its public sphere and not interfering in the (private) autonomous sphere of conscience and belief. Saba Mahmood describes the
consequences of these complex moves for secular liberalism as follows:
[C]ontrary to the ideological self-understanding of secularism
(as the doctrinal separation of religion and state), secularism has
historically entailed the regulation and reformation of religious
beliefs, doctrines, and practices to yield a particular normative
conception of religion (that is largely Protestant Christian in its
contours). Historically speaking, the secular state has not simply
cordoned off religion from its regulatory ambitions but sought to
remake it through the agency of the law. This remaking is shot
through with tensions and paradoxes that cannot simply be attributed to the intransigency of religionists (Muslims or
Christians).167
The process of democratic self-government and the space of public debate can in this respect be seen as a space, not simply of expression and
rational deliberation, but “of formation, in which both coercive, regulatory, and rhetorical power is necessary in order to produce the right kind
of citizen subject who can inhabit the norms of a liberal democratic pol168
ity.” In its supranational supervisory role, the European Court of
Human Rights can be seen to be acting not only as an independent protector of rights but also as instrument of governance maintaining a
particular social order. The difference between these two roles is between a rights-based culture of justification on the one hand and a
169
managerial culture of rights as têchne on the other.
167.
Mahmood, supra note 113, at 87 (emphasis added).
168.
Comments by Saba Mahmood, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Univ. of Cal.
Berkeley, on Una’s Lecture delivered by Robert Post, the David Boies Professor of Law, Yale
Univ., Religion and Freedom of Speech: Cartoons and Controversies 2 (Mar. 14, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/pubs/post_mahmood.pdf. The
public sphere is thus “not simply a domain of unhindered communication, but also a disciplinary space that inhibits certain kinds of speech while enabling others, equipping people to
hear specific types of arguments while remaining deaf to others.” Id.
169.
For further discussion, see infra Part III.C.
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1. Enlightenment Rationalism
Part I.A observed that the basic liberal ideas of individual right and a
public-private divide are often traced back to the Enlightenment of the
late eighteenth century. In his famous 1784 essay, Kant distinguished
between the public and private uses of reason: the idea that reason must
be “free” in its public use (aude sapere; exercised in “broad daylight”),
and “submissive” in its private use (the subjection of completely free
170
reason to particular shared public ends). But as Michel Foucault acutely observed, this is “term for term, the opposite of what is ordinarily
called freedom of conscience.”171
What Foucault noticed was the “substantial reversal” in modern sec172
ular discourse posited more recently by Steven Smith. For Kant, the
submissive role of reason in the private sphere was on account of the
moral duty to follow one’s conscience whereas the free use of reason in
the public sphere was on account of the right to “use reason publicly in
all matters.”173 Two centuries later, however, these distinctions have
effectively been reversed. In the private sphere, the duty to follow conscience has been transformed into the notion of freedom of conscience
understood now as a personal right to do whatever one believes is the
right thing to do. While the equation of conscience with autonomy has
170.
Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in What Is
Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions
58, 59–60 (James Schmidt ed., 1996). See generally Onora O’Neill, Kant on Reason and Religion: Lecture I: Reasoned Hope, Tanner Lectures on Human Values Delivered at Harvard
University (Apr. 1–3, 1996), in 18 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 269, 271 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1997), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/
documents/oneill97.pdf (discussing Kant’s philosophy of religion generally and considering
whether critics are correct in their assessment that Kant’s arguments for practical reason “cannot escape the colossal wreck of rationalist metaphysics and theology and the threat to
religious faith”).
171.
Michel Foucault, What Is Enlightenment?, in The Foucault Reader 32, 36 (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984).
172.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
173.
Kant, supra note 170, at 59. O’Neill has explained the meaning of this statement in
O’Neill, supra note 73, at 32–34. On the meaning of Kant’s statement that “the public use of
reason should be free,” see O’Neill, supra note 73, at 30–39. One must be cautious not to
read a Millian conception of autonomy (i.e., one premised on rational autonomous choice or
individual self-determination) back into Kant’s notion of the free public use of reason. See
Onora O’Neill, The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor’s New Clothes, 77 Aristotelian Soc’y (Supplementary Volume) 1, 3–8 (2003) (explaining the basic differences
between Kantian and Millian conceptions of autonomy). Indeed, “[Kant] commends Frederick
the Great’s ranking of intellectual above civil freedom in his statement ‘Argue as much as you
like about whatever you like, but obey!’ ” O’Neill, supra note 73, at 32. Kant’s argument thus
assumes the authority of an absolutist state beyond the reach of critical reason itself. As
O’Neill notes, “Kant has some misplaced faith in the self-restraint of enlightened despots as a
route of advance.” O’Neill, supra note 73, at 39. I am grateful to Saba Mahmood for this
point.
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been partial and unstable, the result today is that the private sphere is
paradoxically viewed as a space of freedom in terms of noninterference
174
by the state and religious authority alike. Thus, in political liberalism
the demands of equality and nondiscrimination are viewed as not extending into the private sphere (where individuals and religious institutions
remain free to discriminate on the basis of, inter alia, religion and belief
itself)175 while, conversely, conscience is viewed as “freely chosen” and
the coercive authority of religious institutions in enforcing the demands
176
of conscience is denied.
174.
O’Neill states that the priority accorded to public use of reason by Kant does indeed
constitute “an apparent ‘inversion’ of traditional liberal priorities” but “that the traditional
precedence accorded private uses of reason (and other private affairs) in much liberal thinking
is less central to liberalism than is often assumed.” O’Neill, supra note 73, at 35. On the logic
of Kant’s thinking, this is because
[s]ome private uses of reason . . . may hinder or prevent communication with the
world at large [e.g. expressions that denigrate or mock or bully others or foment divisions between persons and groups], and so may hinder the emergence of public
standards of reasoning and of a just polity. There are no good reasons for tolerating
any private uses of reason that damage public uses of reason. . . . Hence some forms
of censorship and restriction of private uses of reason may be acceptable (indeed
required) when (but only when) they are needed to foster or sustain capacities for
communication with the world at large. Kantian liberalism can provide reason for
specific restraint and censorship when their absence would lead to forms of defamation or harassment that damage capacities for agency or for recognition of others’
agency.
Id. at 49.
175.
See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 Yale L.J. 1399, 1402 (2003)
(“[The] Enlightenment compromise . . . justified reason in the public sphere by allowing deference to religious despotism in the private . . . . ”). What Sunder overlooks is that—for Kant
at least—the deference that was owed in the private sphere was to “conscience,” understood in
recognizably Protestant or “privatized” terms, as opposed to “religion” per se. Thus, the problem of “religious despotism” in the form of absolute religious authority was implicitly dealt
with in the (re)definition of religion and religious subjectivity. For further explanation of
Kant’s views on religion, see Peter Danchin, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, The Immanent
Frame (Apr. 21, 2010, 9:40 AM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/04/21/good-muslim-badmuslim.
176.
As noted by Smith, “the Protestant Reformation altered the significance of conscience in a way that profoundly affected, and to some extent redirected, historical
commitments to the separation of church and state.” Smith, Discourse in the Dusk, supra note
46, at 1877. This occurred in two ways. First, by bringing churches under state control in
“Erastian” arrangements based on the notion that “the church had no proper coercive jurisdiction independent of the civil magistrate.” Id. at 1877 n.34 (quoting Richard W. Garrett,
Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22
J.L. & Religion 503, 513 (2007)). Second, by changing the concept of the church itself in the
sense that “whereas Catholic teaching had emphasized the necessity of the church as an intermediary between God and humans, Protestants sought to cut out (or at least downsize) the
middle man . . . and to encourage a more direct relation between the individual and God.” Id.
at 1877. The words of Thomas Paine in 1794, “[m]y own mind is my own church,” marked the
shift that had occurred “as the position and functions formerly controlled by the church came
to be transferred to the individual and his or her [own] conscience.” Id. at 1878 (quoting
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In the public sphere, the situation is reversed. What for Kant was
seen as a fundamental right to reason freely has been transformed into a
moral duty to follow the demands of (universal) reason. Today, the public sphere is thus viewed as a space where rationalism itself imposes
disciplinary limits and secular constraints on freedom of thought, conscience, and speech.177 Foucault describes this as Kant’s “contract of
rational despotism with free reason: the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition,
however, that the political principle that must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal reason.”178
In this sequence of terms, we recognize the key elements of modern
liberal discourse: autonomy (the “public and free use of autonomous reason”), neutrality (the “political principle”), and the right (“universal
reason”). While rhetorically powerful as an apparently apodictic or external means by which to secure secular authority in the public sphere,179
the insuperable difficulty is that each of these notions depends upon distinctive and contingent internal reasons and substantive values.180 As Ian
Thomas Paine, Age of Reason 6 (1794), reprinted in The Theological Works of Thomas
Paine (1879)).
177.
The dominant assumption is that “[m]odern political discourse, including constitutional discourse and in particular the discourse of religious freedom, is thoroughly secular in
character,” id. at 1881, “based on assumptions which confine religious and theological matters
to the private sphere,” Graeme Smith, A Short History of Secularism 5 (2008) (citations
omitted). It is thus commonly assumed
that a constitutional discourse based on religious assumptions or commitments
would violate the constitutional commitments to religious freedom and the separation of church and state. Perhaps paradoxically . . . the very commitment to
religious freedom has worked to render inadmissible the rationales that historically
generated and supported that commitment.
Smith, Discourse in the Dusk, supra note 46, at 1881–82. In this respect, “[a] more complete
account would depict this change not so much as one from a ‘religious’ to a ‘secular’ framework as a transformation in the conception of what ‘secular’ means.” Id. at 1881 n.56
(emphasis added). The result has been the gradual loss of the jurisdictional premises used to
justify the early tradition of religious freedom and the rise of modern liberal theories of justice
that, somehow, must explain how the state is to be neutral between religion and nonreligion
while at the same time according religion special legal treatment. As Smith concludes, “the
bottom line is that actual legal and political jurisdiction now belongs to the state,” with the
result that “the church will ultimately enjoy as much freedom or immunity, and only as much,
as the state and its (secular) constitution see fit to grant.” Id. at 1882.
178.
Foucault, supra note 171, at 37.
179.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
180.
See Peter G. Danchin, Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm and Incitement to
Religious Hatred, 2 Duke F.L. & Soc. Change 5, 8–9 (2010) [hereinafter Danchin, Defaming
Muhammad] (“What characterizes classical arguments for secular liberal principles advanced
by thinkers as diverse as Mill, Locke, Kant and Rawls is the assumption that there are external
reasons that all rational people should be bound by, simply in virtue of their rationality. The
difficulty [as we saw in Part I.C] is that while rationality is a shared human faculty, there are
no such uncontested external or a priori universal reasons. All reasons appeal, at some level of
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Hunter has observed, Kant’s principles of morality and right are grounded in a comprehensive “Christian-Platonic anthropology deeply
embedded in the history of north–German Protestant university metaphysics.”181 On the basis of this metaphysical view, Kant characterized
man as “the empirical harbinger of a pure rational being” (homo noumenon) who, by intelligizing “the pure forms of experience, and
[governing] the will by thinking the ‘idea’ or form of its law [was] supposed to free himself from the ‘sensuous inclinations’ that otherwise tie
the will of empirical man (homo phenomenon) to extrinsic ends or
goods.”182 It is this metaphysical account of human rationality that provides the basis for the two central tenets of Kant’s moral philosophy,
namely
his conception of the good will as one that transcends distracting
sensuous inclinations by spontaneously conforming itself to pure
reason’s intellection of the idea of the law; and his conception of
moral community as the “kingdom of ends in themselves” that is
formed when the universe of rational beings is joined through
transparent reciprocal willing in accordance with this intellection.183
Under this view, the liberal-autonomous subject remains in part a religious subject, but only in the private sphere where religion is tacitly
assumed or (re)defined in Protestant terms to take the form of private
184
“belief or conscience,” which paradoxically is seen as “freely chosen.”
As noted above, the neutrality of the state then simultaneously mediates
and circumscribes this private sphere through a scheme of individual
rights and the right to freedom of religion and belief in particular. The
notion of secular or universal law is encompassed in the categorical rationalism of the liberal algebra itself: “Act externally in such a way that
the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law.”185 Each of these moves involve fraught and

justification, to substantive value commitments and these may or may not be shared by persons of divergent religious and cultural backgrounds.”). On the distinction between external
and internal reasons, see Akeel Bilgrami, Secularism and Relativism, 31:2 Boundary 2, Summer 2004, at 173 (“It is a theoretical fallacy to declare the opponents of secular liberalism
irrational by standards of rationality that all rational people accept.”).
181.
Ian Hunter, Kant’s Regional Cosmopolitanism, 12 J. Hist. Int’l L. 165, 173
(2010).
182.
Id. at 173–74.
183.
Id. at 174.
184.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
185.
Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Reasonableness, in The Culture of Toleration
in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance 13, 14 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003). For Kant, this uniquely “rational” normative understanding of
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contested claims that in effect define enlightenment as the discovery of
an exit, a “way out,” a “process that releases us from the status of ‘immaturity’ ” (a state where religious authority takes the place of our
conscience) by a “modification of the preexisting relation linking will,
authority, and the use of reason.”186
There are two points I wish to make regarding this metaphysical
conception of rationality and its incorporation into the notion of “right.”
The first concerns the type of constraint that is imposed on religion by
Kant’s notion of the good will. In this recognizably Protestant understanding of religion in terms of interiorized (or “privatized”) and
simultaneously “freely chosen” conscience or belief, we can see the
unique double bind that today defines the secular liberal notion of religious freedom as an individual right.187
The second point concerns Kant’s derivation of a pure norm of right
from man’s “rational being.” Given the regional character of Kant’s
view—not only to, but within Europe, and to a local branch of Protestant
German metaphysical philosophy at that—it is difficult to see how this
account of universal reason can form the basis of a supranational normative order able to harmonize not only rival European but also nonEuropean religious, cultural, and political metaphysics.188

freedom was not the indiscriminate realization of one’s passions or interests—
indeed, this was immaturity . . . . Freedom could exist only as looking beyond such
contingencies. To be free was to make one’s will harmonious to universal reason—a
reason according to which one should always act in accordance with what one can
simultaneously will as universal law. Where enlightenment lay in reliance on reason, freedom consisted in the acceptance of what reason dictated as duty.
Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 at 191 (2001) (emphasis added). On the implications of
categorical rationalism for liberal rights theorizing, see infra Section III.B.
186.
Foucault, supra note 171, at 35.
187.
The idea of a “double bind” between consent and justice in international legal argument is powerfully developed in Koskenniemi, supra note 112, passim; see also Peter G.
Danchin, Who Is the ‘Human’ in Human Rights? The Claims of Culture and Religion, 24 Md.
J. Int’l L. 99, 103 (2009) (querying whether the terms “conscience” and “reason” in Article 1
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are “perhaps the two ascending and descending
argumentative positions captured in our singular notion of ‘right’—a notion which itself
straddles between the Human and a transcendent or metaphysical notion of (universal) Liberty”).
188.
See, e.g., Ian Hunter, Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical
History of the Law of Nature and Nations, in Law and Politics in British Colonial
Thought: Transpositions of Empire 12 (Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds., 2010)
(“[The] ‘regional’ . . . character of European jus gentium discourses cannot be comprehended
in relation to a transcendent global justice or universal history that these discourses failed to
realize . . . [but instead] can be grasped only by situating them in the immanent conflicts
among the rival intellectual cultures on which they were based, and the clashing religious and
political programs in which these discourses were anchored.”).
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If this is correct, the real challenge confronting the European Court
of Human Rights is whether it is possible to recover the noninstrumental
dimensions of Kant’s project of freedom without necessarily adopting
the historically and culturally contingent aspects of its metaphysical philosophy. In this respect, the significance of Kant’s ideals lies in the
notion that principles of right (the communal will of a rational community) are necessary conditions for a political project which seeks to
reconcile self-interest with a cosmopolitan legal order. Such a project
requires both political contestation and the use of critical judgment, each
of which are incapable of being derived from instrumental reason and
must encompass the perspective of the whole (the ideal of the “kingdom
of ends in themselves”).189
For Koskenniemi, this constitutes a project of freedom in two
distinct senses:
First, it holds political judgment open to different, even opposing, alternatives, highlighting the (legal) accountability of the
one who makes the judgment. Second, its concept of legal expertise is not that of instrumental skill but a mindset—a
“constitutional mindset”—that is constantly measuring any
judgment or institutional alternative against the ideal of universality embedded in the very idea of rule by law (instead of by
expert decision).190
Under this view, the significance of autonomy is not on account of a particular conception of the good (for example, that personal autonomy is a
precondition for the good or just life), but rather on account of the demanding moral-political virtue to respect others as “reason-giving” and
191
“reason-receiving” subjects with a right to justification. Further, the
significance of critical judgment lies in the notion that human rationality
must recognize its own boundaries and finitude, and—with full knowledge, not of ends, but of indeterminacy and contingency—accept the
unavoidability of conflict between plural values.

189.
O’Neill argues that in fact for Kant “reason . . . has no transcendent foundation,
but” rather relies for its authority on “agreement based on principles that meet their own criticism.” O’Neill, supra note 73, at 38. Thus, “principles of reason vindicate their authority by
their stamina when applied to themselves. . . . [S]uch self-criticism is best sustained in the
form of free, critical and universal debate.” Id.
190.
Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 395, 415 (2009).
191.
See Danchin, Defaming Muhammad, supra note 180, at 33–37 (comparing John
Locke’s liberal argument with the reflexive account of religious toleration advanced by Pierre
Bayle); see also Rainer Forst, Pierre Bayle’s Reflexive Theory of Toleration, in Toleration
and Its Limits 78 (Jeremy Waldron & Melissa Williams eds., 2008).
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If we apply these principles to Islam and the claims of Muslim
communities, we can see that serious engagement in a project of this
kind would require a comparative dialogue across the putative divide
between Western and non-Western traditions of critique and practice.
Saba Mahmood suggests that the viability of such a dialogue depends on
making a distinction between the labor entailed in the analysis of
a phenomenon and defending our own beliefs in certain secular
conceptions of liberty and attachment. The tension between the
two is a productive one for the exercise of critique insomuch as
it suspends the closure necessary to political action so as to allow thinking to proceed in unaccustomed ways.192
It is disappointing in this regard that the European Court of Human
Rights has to date employed an excessively rationalist mode of justification in its jurisprudence on Islam. To the extent that the Court has been
prepared to incorporate dialogic elements in its reasoning, it has done so
only in cases involving Christianity, such as in Wingrove and OttoPreminger, where a right to be free from injury to religious feelings was
193
found to be within the scope of Article 9(1).
Whether in its rationalist or dialogic modes then, the Court has constructed narratives of secularism, freedom, and equality that, by tacitly
subsuming or incorporating Christian or post-Christian norms into the
meaning and scope of Article 9, has placed in jeopardy and marginalized
the religious freedom claims of Muslim (and other religious) communities. The Court’s jurisprudence thus squarely raises for consideration
what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity in the modern world, and what practices may be necessary to make certain types of
claims to religious freedom not mute but intelligible within the rights
discourse of the ECHR.194
2. Value Pluralism
Let us recall again the first two lines of cases discussed in Part II. Section II.A argued that the controversy in Kokkinakis, involving proselytism
directed at a member of the Eastern Orthodox majority in Greece, cannot
be understood without taking into account the collective dimensions of
Article 9. This includes not only the interests and conceptions of the
good protected by the right to religious freedom but also the relationship
192.
For Mahmood, our ability to think outside this set of limitations necessarily requires the labor of critique, which rests, not on its putative claims to moral or epistemological
superiority, but rather its ability to recognize and parochialize its own affective commitments
that contribute to the problem in various ways. Mahmood, supra note 113, at 90–92.
193.
See infra Part III.B.
194.
Mahmood, supra note 113, at 70–71.
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between both the individual and the state, and between differently situated groups within the state. The controversy, in other words, requires a
complex understanding of the corresponding tensions that arise from
different individual and collective claims of right.195
Similarly in Section II.B, the conclusions in Wingrove and OttoPreminger that “respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 can legitimately be thought to have been violated by
provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration”196 require the
prior recognition of the presence (and sensitivity) of religious beliefs or
practices in public space. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that liberal theorists have criticized the Court’s wide reading of the scope of
Article 9(1) in Otto-Preminger, questioning “whether an entirely passive
state, which is dependent upon the inaction of others rather than the inaction of the believer, properly constitutes a manifestation of those
beliefs.”197 It is only if one already has assumed that the proper place of
religion is in the forum internum of private thought, belief, and conscience that such criticisms become plausible.198 The fact that the Court
has been prepared to recognize certain collective aspects of religious
freedom suggests that religion and religious values are not in fact as absolutely privatized and disestablished as liberal theory would have us
presume.
Such controversies over the presence of religion in the public sphere
are strongly contested in Europe today. In the 2009 case of Lautsi v. Italy, the Second Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held
unanimously that the presence of crucifixes in Italian public school
195.
See Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes, supra note 95, at 272 (arguing that the
Court in Kokkinakis faced not one but two types of conflict: the first between various individual rights claims, some of which were internal to Article 9 and others which were between
Article 9 and other related rights such as free speech; the second between incompatible conceptions of the collective good).
196.
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 18 (1994); see
also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
197.
Edge, supra note 110, at 682.
198.
See Danchin, Defaming Muhammad, supra note 180, at 29–30.
The forum internum or internal sphere of personal thought, conscience, or belief of
speaker and listener alike is absolutely protected from interference by the law, i.e. is
nonderogable and not subject to limitation by the state. The critique of ideas, symbols or traditions — each located on the “value” side of the fact/value distinction —
is within the sovereignty of this realm and thus inviolable. While critique does involve action or manifestation of belief in the form of speech or other expression and
is thus potentially subject to reasonable limitation in the forum externum, it is not
seen to interfere with the forum internum of listeners who, while potentially offended, insulted, and even threatened by the speech, remain free to believe in the
tenets of their faith or religious tradition.
Id.
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classrooms violates the right of children to religious freedom under Article 9.199 The decision was met with outrage in Italy, which appealed to
the Grand Chamber of the Court in conjunction with seven other Euro200
pean states.
Central to the Second Chamber’s reasoning was the proposition that
the “[s]tate’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any
kind of power on its part to assess the legitimacy of religious convictions
or the ways of expressing those convictions.”201 From this initial premise,
the outcome of the case was all but determined. The decision to place “a
crucifix on the wall of a classroom” is quite obviously “an assessment of
the legitimacy of a particular religious conviction,”202 Christianity.
But as Joseph Weiler argued on appeal before the Grand Chamber on
behalf of eight intervening states, this formulation of neutrality is based
on a number of conceptual errors that fail to take into account the tensions between individual rights and collective identity on the one hand,
and between the uniform values of the ECHR and the rich European tradition of diversity of values on the other.203 For Weiler, the supranational
legal order of the ECHR represents a unique balance between the individual liberty of (and from) religion and the collective liberty to define
both state and nation in terms of religious symbols—even to the extent
of having an established or official religion as in the United Kingdom,
Greece, or Denmark.204 By insisting on a rigid U.S.-style separation of
199.
Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, ¶¶ 48–58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Second Section
Nov. 3, 2009), referral to Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber (Mar. 1, 2010), http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=857725&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (“[T]he
compulsory display of a symbol of a particular faith in the exercise of public authority in relation to specific situations subject to governmental supervision, particularly in classrooms,
restricts the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions and
the right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe.”).
200.
The appeal was heard in Strasbourg on June 30, 2010. See Joseph Weiler, Editorial,
Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 1 (2010), http://
www.ejil.org/pdfs/21/1/1985.pdf (“[T]he decision of the Second Chamber of the ECtHR is an
embarrassment.”). The judgment of the Grand Chamber was released on March 18, 2011. See
infra note 210 and accompanying text.
201.
Lautsi (Second Section), ¶ 47(e).
202.
Oral Argument at 1:15, Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand
Chamber June 30, 2010) (quoting Lautsi (Second Section), ¶ 47), http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+of+pupubl+hearings/webcastEN_media?&p_url
=20100630-1/en (stating that, according to Lautsi, the crucifix on the wall of a classroom was
violative of the “states’ duty of neutrality and impartiality”).
203.
Id. at 1:13.
204.
Weiler, supra note 200, at 2 (“How one draws the line between the identitarian
aspects of the state which might have religious elements and the need for an education which
is free and not religiously coercive is an important and delicate issue. But you cannot even
begin to draw that line if you do not acknowledge that in Europe there is such a line to be
drawn . . . . The European landscape which accepts as legitimate a UK and a France, a Malta
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church and state or a laïque form deriving from the French Revolution,
which treats religion solely as a private matter,205 the Second Chamber’s
antipluralist judgment is not neutral in that it implies that religious Europeans cannot be trusted because they have opted for a non-laïque state
and wish to live by the principles of toleration, pluralism, and nondiscrimination.
A more robust pluralist liberalism rejects any notion that to be democratic you must not be religious and, while insisting on respect for
individual freedom of religion and belief, recognizes that the state may
nevertheless define itself and its public spaces by reference to the religious heritage, symbols, and collective identity of its people. There is
thus no duty for a state to be laïque, but rather a democratic right of peoples to determine for themselves the place of religion in the public
sphere of the state.206 This claim is not only legal and political, whether
in the form of the right of a nation to a state, or of a minority to sub-state
minority rights. The claim is also ethical and cultural, in the form of a
collective right to preserve the existence of a unique social group. When
these two claims are conjoined—when a cultural or religious group asserts legal autonomy in the form of a state—statehood becomes the
means of enhancing or protecting cultural and religious identities. By
securing the public space of the state to preserve national customs or
traditions, the state in this way assumes a “cultural essence.”207
The cultural function of the nation-state has particular importance
for our understanding of religious freedom. This is because the culture
and historical traditions of national groups have been shaped, to varying
degrees, by particular religious traditions. Virtually all national constituor Greece or Ireland as well as an Italy, is a unique and uniquely promising model of tolerance
and pluralism.”).
205.
Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra note 66, at 21–25; see also supra note 146 and
accompanying text. “Laïcité is an idea that describes a specific conception of the publicprivate divide and state ‘neutrality’ in strictly secular terms.” Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra
note 66, at 21 (citing 1958 Const. 2 (Fr.)).
206.
It is a basic axiom of international law that “peoples” have a right to selfdetermination. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Many scholars today argue that the nation-state itself embodies the
recognition that there is a morally significant connection between human freedom and a collective cultural life. National self-determination on this view is a “cultural right” in the sense
that national, cultural, and religious communities seek and require not private but “public
spheres” of their own in order to flourish and ultimately to survive. See, e.g., Yael Tamir,
Liberal Nationalism 8–9 (1993) (“[The] demand for a public sphere in which the cultural
aspects of national life come to the fore constitutes the essence of the right to national selfdetermination.”).
207.
Yael Tamir, The Right to National Self-Determination, 58 Soc. Res. 565, 585–86
(1991).
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tions recognize a distinct relationship between the state on the one hand,
and religion in general, or one or more religions or beliefs in particular,
208
on the other. At the same time, constitutions also recognize fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of religion or belief, the right to
equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of religion, and the right of
religious minorities to practice their own religion.
The critical question then in cases such as Lautsi is whether (and
how) the state is able to honor both of these sets of commitments and
handle the potentially far-reaching conflicts to which they give rise.
Recognition of a special relationship between the state and a particular
religion may, for example, conflict in various ways with the principle of
nondiscrimination. Conversely, constitutional recognition of a belief system of an antireligious or aggressively “secular” character may conflict
with the full protection of the right to freedom of religion. The laïque
tradition seeks to resolve this dilemma through a particular binary form
of secular rationalism that is neutral neither towards specific religions
nor religion in general.209 The more robust value-pluralist tradition which
has historically defined the secular nomos of the ECHR—at least as regards European nation-states intra se—rests instead on notions of liberal
toleration and the recognition of a diversity of forms of legal accommodation between religion and the state, as reflected in the wide scope
accorded to both Article 9 and the margin of appreciation.
These themes are reflected in the various separate opinions of the
Grand Chamber in its final judgment in Lautsi, which was handed down
on March 18, 2011. By a majority of 15 to 2, the Grand Chamber reversed the judgment of the Second Chamber, holding that “the decision
whether crucifixes should be present in State-school classrooms is, in
principle, a matter falling within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State.”210 The majority agreed with the Second Chamber that
the right to religious freedom in Article 9 includes the freedom not to
belong to a religion and imposes a duty on the State of “neutrality and
208.
For a review of the variety of religion-state relationships as expressed in national
constitutions, see Johan D. van der Vyver, Introduction: Legal Dimensions of Religious Human Rights: Constitutional Texts, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective,
supra note 14, at xi.
209.
See Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra note 66, at 24.
210.
Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, ¶ 70 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber Mar. 18,
2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf. While
the regulations “prescribing the presence of crucifixes in State-school classrooms . . . confer
on the country’s majority religion preponderant visibility in the school environment . . . [such
visibility] is not in itself sufficient . . . to denote a process of indoctrination on the respondent
State’s part and establish a breach of the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1,” which
requires the state to respect the right of parents to ensure education and teaching in conformity
with their own religious and philosophical convictions. Id. ¶ 71.
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impartiality.”211 On the two central questions of the scope of Article 9 and
the nature of the public sphere, however, the majority disagreed with the
reasoning of the Second Chamber. The Court held first, that “a crucifix
on a wall is an essentially passive symbol . . . [and] cannot be deemed to
have an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities”;212 and second, that “the decision
whether or not to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle within the margin of appreciation.”213 The reasoning underlying each of these
arguments, however, is conclusory at best. The first argument fails
squarely to confront the inherent tensions between the individual and
collective aspects of the right to religious freedom; the second fails to
explain how, or whether, the rich diversity of religious values and traditions in the public sphere of European nation-states is compatible with
the Court’s earlier, more demanding conceptions of neutrality and secularism in Refah, Șahin, and Dogru.214
The first of these concerns was addressed by the dissenting opinion,
which asks whether states’ duty of impartiality and neutrality can be
maintained “where they mainly have regard to the beliefs held by the
majority?”215 For the dissenters, in states with a dominant majority religion such as Italy, the Court should accord a narrower margin of
216
appreciation and should be cognizant of the fact that “negative freedom of religion . . . deserves special protection if it is the State which
displays a religious symbol and dissenters are placed in a situation from
which they cannot extract themselves.”217
211.
Id. ¶ 60.
212.
Id. ¶ 72. The majority distinguished Dahlab v. Switzerland on the basis that the
measure at issue in that case prohibited “the applicant from wearing the Islamic headscarf
while teaching” and concerned children of “tender age . . . for whom the applicant was responsible.” Id. ¶ 73. The Court further noted that crucifixes are “not associated with
compulsory teaching of Christianity”; that Italy “opens up the school environment in parallel
to other religions”; that there is no evidence that school authorities are “intolerant of pupils
who believed in other religions, were non-believers or who held non-religious philosophical
convictions”; and that there was no claim that “the presence of the crucifix in classrooms had
encouraged the development of teaching practices with a proselytizing tendency.” Id. ¶ 74.
213.
Id. ¶ 68. Noting the divergent views of the Italian courts on the meaning of the
crucifix, the majority further notes that the Court must “take into account the fact that Europe
is marked by a great diversity between the States of which it is composed, particularly in the
sphere of cultural and historical development.” Id.
214.
See supra notes 122–140 and accompanying text.
215.
Lautsi (Grand Chamber), at 47–48, ¶ 1 (Malinverni and Kalaydjieva, JJ., dissenting). “We now live in a multicultural society, in which the effective protection of religious
freedom and of the right to education requires strict State neutrality in State-school education
. . . . ” Id. at 48–49, ¶ 2.
216.
Cf. Urbinati, supra note 80.
217.
Lautsi (Grand Chamber), at 50–51 ¶ 5 (Malinverni and Kalaydjieva, JJ., dissenting).
The dissenting opinion thus expressly rejects the majority’s attempt to distinguish Dahlab v.
Switzerland:
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In finding Italy in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article
9, the dissenting opinion itself fails, however, to squarely address the
second issue concerning the nature of the public sphere and the deeper
conceptual questions concerning the normative meaning of neutrality.
Here, the separate concurring opinions of Judges Bonello and Power are
illuminating. For Judge Bonello, writing in rather polemical terms, “[n]o
court, certainly not this Court, should rob the Italians of part of their cultural personality” and “before joining any crusade to demonise the
crucifix, we should start by placing the presence of that emblem in Italian schools in its rightful historical perspective.”218 Central to Judge
Bonello’s conception of neutrality is the distinction between freedom of
religion and secularism:
The Convention has given this Court the remit to enforce freedom of religion and of conscience, but has not empowered it to
bully States into secularism or to coerce countries into schemes
of religious neutrality. It is for each individual State to choose
whether to be secular or not, and whether, and to what extent, to
separate Church and governance. What is not for the State to do
is to deny freedom of religion and of conscience to anyone. An
immense, axiomatic chasm separates one prescriptive concept
from the other non-prescriptive ones.219
In adopting what we may term a “liberal nationalist” account of religious
freedom,220 Judge Bonello concluded by arguing that removing the crucifix from Italian schools would not be neutral but instead “a positive and
aggressive espousal of agnosticism or of secularism” while conversely

The presence of crucifixes in schools is capable of infringing religious freedom and
schoolchildren’s right to education to a greater degree than religious apparel that,
for example, a teacher might wear, such as the Islamic headscarf. In the latter example the teacher in question may invoke her own freedom of religion, which must
also be taken into account, and which the State must also respect. The public authorities cannot, however, invoke such a right.
Id. at 51, ¶ 6.
218.
Id. at 38, ¶ 1.2–1.3 (Bonello, J., concurring). After detailing the long relationship
between Christianity and education in Italy, Judge Bonello observes that the “scansion of the
Italian school calendar further testifies to the inextricable historical links between education
and religion in Italy, obstinate ties which have lasted throughout the centuries.” Id. at 39, ¶ 1.6.
219.
Id. at 40, ¶ 2.3. Thus, freedom of religion is not the “seductive notions” of “separation of Church and State” or “religious equidistance”; “[i]n Europe, secularism is optional,
freedom of religion is not.” Id. at 40, ¶ 2.5.
220.
See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text (noting the ethical and cultural
aspects of religious freedom viewed as a collective right).
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“[k]eeping a symbol where it has always been is no act of intolerance by
believers or cultural traditionalists.”221
Judge Power in her separate concurring opinion agreed with Judge
222
Bonello that neutrality does not require a secularist approach. But she
proceeded to set out a more genuinely value-pluralist approach that is
sensitive not only to the values of the majority but also those of religious
(and nonreligious) minorities. For Judge Power, crucifixes in school
classrooms are not simply “passive symbols” as the majority asserts, but
rather “carriers of meaning . . . [that may] speak volumes without, however, doing so in a coercive or in an indoctrinating manner.”223 What is
pivotal to her concurrence is the fact that
Italy opens up the school environment to a variety of religions
and there is no evidence of any intolerance shown towards nonbelievers or those who hold non-religious philosophical convictions. Islamic headscarves may be worn. The beginning and end
of Ramadan are “often celebrated.” Within such a pluralist and
tolerant context, a Christian symbol on a classroom wall presents yet another and a different world view. The presentation of
and engagement with different points of view is an intrinsic part
of the educative process. It acts as a stimulus to dialogue. A truly
pluralist education involves exposure to a variety of different
ideas including those which are different from one’s own. Dialogue becomes possible and, perhaps, is at its most meaningful
where there is a genuine difference of opinion and an honest exchange of views.224
Judge Power’s concurrence can be read as a powerful response to the
two main arguments made in the dissenting opinion. In reply to the claim
that neutrality cannot be maintained in states with dominant majority
religions, Judge Power emphasized the duty on the state to respect the
religious freedom of all persons and groups (both majorities and minorities). In reply to the second claim that the presence of religious symbols
in the public sphere violates the negative freedom of followers of other
221.
Lautsi (Grand Chamber), at 41, ¶ 2.10 (Bonello, J., concurring). “Millions of Italian
children have, over the centuries, been exposed to the crucifix in schools. This has neither
turned Italy into a confessional State, nor the Italians into citizens of a theocracy.” Id. at 41,
¶ 2.11.
222.
“To my mind, the Chamber Judgment was striking in its failure to recognise that
secularism (which was the applicant’s preferred belief or world view) was, in itself, one ideology among others. A preference for secularism over alternative world views—whether
religious, philosophical or otherwise—is not a neutral option.” Id. at 44–45 (Power, J., concurring).
223.
Id. at 45.
224.
Id. at 45–46.
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religions or of nonreligionists, Judge Power argued that what neutrality
properly requires is a pluralist and inclusive rather than secularist and
exclusionary approach by the state.
Judge Power’s pluralist approach also provides the means by which
to critique the various contradictions plaguing the majority judgment. By
accepting Judge Bonello’s position that Christianity is historically rooted
in the public sphere of European nation-states (and vice versa),225 Judge
Power’s opinion implicitly challenges the solely individualistic account
of the right to religious freedom advanced in the majority judgment. Further, the distinction drawn between pluralism and secularism throws into
question the Court’s earlier reliance on substantive notions of secularism
and equality to justify restrictions on religious freedom in cases such as
Șahin and Refah. The Court barely masks this inconsistency by broadly
invoking the margin of appreciation rather than confronting more openly
the relationship between neutrality and secularism. Judge Power’s opinion thus exposes a double contradiction in the Court’s Article 9
jurisprudence: first, finding a danger of pressure or proselytizing when a
medical student wears an Islamic headscarf to a public university (Șahin)
but not when a state officially adopts a majority religious symbol in its
public schools (Lautsi); and second, finding the (democratic) decision
“whether or not to perpetuate a religious tradition” in the public sphere
to be a violation of the principle of secularism in a Muslim-majority
state (Refah) but within the margin of appreciation in a Christianmajority state (Lautsi).
3. Pluralism and Islam
How do we explain these various inconsistencies and contradictions?
If the value-pluralist thesis is correct, the puzzle is why the majority of
the Court in Refah assumes, without argument, that a “plurality of legal
systems,” even if democratically adopted, is incompatible with the
ECHR. Both normatively and factually this is erroneous given the many
secular democratic constitutions around the world that recognize the collective claims of right by religious, ethnic, and linguistic communities.
In India, for example, religious freedom consists in the state giving various religious groups juridical autonomy over family affairs in the form
of family or personal status laws. Accordingly, various religious groups,
including Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsees are legally recognized as both the addressees and bearers of claims
225.
“Judge Bonello has pointed to the fact that within the European tradition, education
(and, to my mind, the values of human dignity, tolerance and respect for the individual, without which there can be no lasting basis for human rights protection) is rooted, historically,
inter alia, within the Christian tradition.” Id. at 45.
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of right.226 These claims are recognized as extending to both individual
and collective aspects of freedom of religion and to the protection of
227
separate (majority and minority) religious and cultural identities.
The same point is applicable in many liberal democratic states. In
South Africa, for example, the post-apartheid constitutional order explicitly incorporates the full array of human rights norms recognized in
international law regarding self-determination, minority rights, freedom
of religion, and substantive equality.228 For the first time in that country’s
history, intensive law reform efforts are now underway to recognize the
claims of and redress past discrimination against different religious
communities, including tribal groups living under customary law and
229
religious minorities with their own family and personal status laws.
It is striking how the norms and assumptions defining these debates
differ markedly from the logic of the majority judgment in Refah, which,
as Judge Kovler observes, rejects “the very idea of such a compromise

226.
See Tahir Mahmood, Religion, Law and Judiciary in Modern India, 2006 BYU L.
Rev. 755 (2006).
227.
Such a conception of religious freedom is not without paradoxes, as exemplified by
continuing political struggles in India over the status of family law. Feminist critics often
assert that these laws privilege group rights over the rights of women as individuals. See, e.g.,
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects,
and “Personal Laws,” in Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues
120, 136–37 (2006). Others respond that establishing a uniform civil code for adjudicating
family affairs would compromise the autonomy accorded to religious minorities. See Flavia
Agnes, The Supreme Court, the Media, and the Uniform Civil Code Debate in India, in The
Crisis of Secularism in India 294 (Anura dha Dingwaney Needham & Rajeswari Sunder
Rajan eds., 2007). Such cases illustrate the contested and polyvalent nature of claims to religious freedom in situations where the collective aspects of the right are expressly included.
See also Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Secularism’s Last Sigh?: The Hindu Right, the
Courts, and India’s Struggle for Democracy, 38 Harv. Int’l L.J. 113, 169–70 (1997) (arguing for a “democratic secularism” in India based on a “substantive approach to equality,
toleration, and freedom of religion” in which “cultural minorities must be free to pursue their
own beliefs, and the state must be willing to accommodate their group differences”).
228.
The 1996 South African Bill of Rights guarantees cultural and religious communities the right to enjoy their culture and practice their religion, and in effect makes both
religious-based law and secular law available for the adjudication of family matters. S. Afr.
Const., 1996, ch. 2, §§ 9 (equality), 15 (freedom of religion, belief and opinion), 31 (cultural,
religious, and linguistic communities), 235 (self-determination). In particular, section 15(3)(a)
provides that the constitution does not prevent legislation recognizing (i) “marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law” or (ii) “systems of
personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular
religion.” S. Afr. Const., 1996, ch. 2, § 15(3)(a). See Peter G. Danchin, Freedom of Religion
and the Recognition of Muslim Marriages in South Africa (on file with author), in Varieties
of Religious Establishments (Lori Beaman & Winnifred Fallers Sullivan eds., forthcoming
2012).
229.
SA Law Commission Report Customary Law: Report on Traditional Courts and the
Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders (Project 90) (Jan. 2003) (S. Afr.); SA Law Reform
Commission Report Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Project 59) (July 2003) (S. Afr.).

DANCHIN FTP 1_C.DOC

Summer 2011]

7/8/2011 9:24:23 AM

Islam in the Secular Nomos

725

from the outset.”230 Even within European states themselves, the question
of recognizing a plurality of legal systems has been a matter of political
debate. In 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury gave a widely-publicized
lecture in which he discussed the relationship between civil and religious
law in England and affirmatively raised for consideration the “presence
of communities which, while no less ‘law-abiding’ than the rest of the
population, relate to something other than the British legal system
alone.”231 Given these evolving conceptions in both rights discourse and
democratic theory, the Court’s reasoning in Refah requires serious reconsideration.
The Court’s interpretation of Islam itself in both Șahin and Dogru is
troubling for similar reasons. As many scholars have argued, wearing the
Islamic headscarf has no single or fixed meaning. Muslim women and
girls wear the hijab for many, often conflicting and conflicted reasons,
some of which are expressions of autonomy, self-realization, resistance,
and freedom.232 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a woman such
as Leyla Șahin must be taken to have freely or traditionally adopted the
headscarf. The notion that the headscarf is imposed on individuals by
Islam and is thus incompatible with contemporary democratic values
says more about a particular liberal conception of religion and religious
subjectivity than about coercion or harm in Islamic religious practices.233
230.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 50–51 (2003)
(Kovler, J., concurring); see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
231.
Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Islam in English Law: Civil and Religious Law in England, Lecture Given at Lambeth Palace (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/07_02_08_islam.pdf. For discussion of similar
proposals regarding the creation of “sharia tribunals” in Canada, see Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 Theoretical
Inquiries in Law 573, 579 (2008) (arguing for “a more context-sensitive analysis that sees
women’s freedom and equality as partly promoted (rather than inhibited) by recognition of
their ‘communal’ identity . . . [that] can help inform creative paths for cooperation that begin
to match the actual complexity of lived experience in our diverse societies”).
232.
As argued by Bhikhu Parekh, the wearing of the hijab by Muslim girls in Europe
is a
highly complex autonomous act intended both to remain within the tradition and to
challenge it, to accept the cultural inequality and to create a space for equality. To
see it merely as a symbol of their subordination, as many French feminists did, is to
miss the subtle dialectic of cultural contestation.
Bhikhu Parekh, A Varied Moral World, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 69, 73
(Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). Given this multitude of meanings and ways in which the
hijab actually works as a religious symbol, its blanket restriction by the state on the assumption that it symbolizes the oppression of women is open to serious question. For a nuanced
analysis of the practice of veiling in Muslim societies, see Nancy Hirschmann, Eastern Veiling, Western Freedom?, 59 Rev. Pol. 461 (1997). See generally Saba Mahmood, Politics of
Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2005).
233.
For a detailed discussion, see Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra note 66.
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In relation to the Court’s construction of secularism as a basis for restricting religious freedom, we might ask whether the history of
Kemalism and militarily enforced secularization in Turkey should provide the normative underpinnings for interpreting Article 9.234 As Judge
Tulkens argued in her dissent in Șahin, while secularism is an essential
principle in a democracy, so is religious freedom; even given the “pressing social need” to prevent radical Islamism, one cannot simply assert
without more a link between the headscarf and fundamentalism.235 Similarly, the notion that the restriction on the headscarf was necessary for
the protection of the rights of other students on the basis that they would
feel pressured, threatened, or otherwise subjected to proselytizing, raises
contested factual and normative questions that cannot easily be assumed
to meet the standard of necessity in a democratic society.
Finally, it is revealing that the House of Lords in Begum placed reliance on, and deferred to, the fact that the school uniform policy of
wearing the hijab but not the jilbab was approved after consultation
with the Imams at three local mosques.236 As John Mikhail has argued,
237
the Lords’ reliance on religious authority in Begum is “deeply ironic.”
Luther’s declaration of autonomy against the Church—“Here I stand, I
can do no other”—has long been held to mean that no one should be
compelled to accept the authority of intermediaries in matters of conscience. The question is why this cherished principle of the liberal
tradition does not appear to apply to Muslims such as Leyla Șahin or
Shabina Begum:
The message [in Begum] is that Reformation and Enlightenment
ideals of individualism, autonomy and the sanctity of the individual conscience are for people like us—not for people like
you. We celebrate human rights, heroic individualism and the
stubborn vindication of self-determination against established
legal, political or religious authorities. You, meanwhile, should
avoid making unnecessary assertions of your so-called “rights,”
and you must conform to the beliefs of whatever religious authorities of yours we choose to recognise. We are distinct
234.
See supra note 131.
235.
Șahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 139 (2007) (Tulkens, J.,
dissenting).
236.
R [Begum] v. Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, ¶¶ 7, 15 (Lord Bingham).
237.
John Mikhail, Dilemmas of Cultural Legality: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s
‘The Struggle for Law’ and a Criticism of the House of Lords’ Opinions in Begum, 4 Int’l
J.L. in Context 385, 392 (2009); cf. Manoussakis v. Greece, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346,
1365 (“The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to
express such beliefs are legitimate.”).
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individuals, while you are an indistinct collective. You cannot
represent yourself; you must be represented.238
The deep historical and normative connections in the liberal imagination between Christianity and the right to religious freedom are here
evident: on the one hand, there is conscience, which is freely chosen,
private, and disestablished; on the other there is religion, which is unchosen, adopted by custom or tradition, public, and sensitive. This tacit
or background conception of religion as conscience is what defines the
basic shape and contours of Article 9 jurisprudence.
On this basis, Saba Mahmood concludes that “secular liberal principles of freedom of religion and speech are not neutral mechanisms for
the negotiation of religious difference and that they remain quite partial
to certain normative conceptions of religion, subject, language, and injury.”239 The consequence is that
European Muslims who want to lay claim to the language of
public order (enshrined in the recent [European Court of Human
Rights] decisions) remain blind to this normative disposition of
secular-liberal law to majority culture. In its concern for public
order and safety, the sensitivities and traditions of a religious
minority are deemed necessarily less weighty than those of the
majority, even in matters of religious freedoms. This is not simply an expression of cultural prejudice; it is constitutive of the
jurisprudential tradition in which the right to free speech and re240
ligious liberty is located.
If correct, this makes the question of translatability of practices and
norms across ethical differences under the framework of ECHR norms
241
intrinsically difficult. In order to see this more clearly, let us turn to the
possible grounds on which the state may seek to limit the freedom to
manifest religion or belief under Article 9(2).

238.
Mikhail, supra note 237, at 392.
239.
Mahmood, supra note 113, at 90. Legal mechanisms are “encoded with an entire set
of cultural and epistemological presuppositions that are not indifferent to how religion is practiced and experienced in different traditions.” Id. at 88. Thus, “[t]o subject an injury predicated
upon distinctly different conceptions of the subject, religiosity, harm, and semiosis to the logic
of civil law is to promulgate its demise (rather than to protect it).” Id.
240.
Id. Finally, it is important to realize that “[t]his is not due to a secular malfeasance
but to a necessary effect that follows from the layers of epistemological, religious, and linguistic commitments built into the matrix of the civil law tradition.” Id. at 90–91.
241.
Mikhail, supra note 237, at 387 (arguing that “what passes for reasoned elaboration
in judicial opinions often manages to conceal an underlying political reality, which itself
mainly consists of relations of power and subordination”).
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B. Public Order and the Rights of Others
Article 9(2) provides, in part, that “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as . . . are
necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of public order
. . . or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”242
The idea that religious freedom may be limited to protect either public order or the rights and freedoms of others has been a feature of the
cases discussed in Part II. In cases involving Islam such as Refah, Șahin,
and Dogru, the Court has advanced a wide conception of public order,
extending beyond the more limited and narrowly defined ground of ordre public243 to encompass substantive notions of secularism and
democracy. It has also invoked the rights and freedoms of others to justify imposing limits on the freedom to manifest Islamic beliefs or
practices in cases such as Dahlab, Șahin, and Dogru.244 This has assumed
two forms: The first, to protect the rights of other students to be free
from the display of religious symbols that “individually or collectively,
or [due] to their ostentatious or demonstrative character, constitute an
exercise of pressure, provocation, proselytizing or propaganda.”245 The
second, to protect women, especially girls, from the discriminatory or
coercive effects of what are regarded as patriarchal religious traditions
and practices.246 As argued in Section III.A, this is a complex set of
moves that rely on substantive underlying notions of autonomy and individual freedom.
In the cases involving Christianity, however, we have seen the Court
invoke these same two grounds to limit other fundamental rights in order
to protect the right to religious freedom. Thus, the right to freedom of
speech in Article 10 was limited in Otto-Preminger and Wingrove to protect religious sensibilities (the rights of others) and to ensure peaceful

242.
ECHR, supra note 6, art. 9, ¶ 2.
243.
See, e.g., Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political
Freedoms, in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 209, 212–13 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (“[L]imitations on freedom to manifest
one’s religion cannot be imposed to protect ordre public with its general connotations of national public policy, but only where necessary to protect public order narrowly construed, i.e.,
to prevent public disorder. A state whose public policy is atheism, for example, cannot invoke
Article 18(3) [of the ICCPR] to suppress manifestations of religion or beliefs.” (footnotes
omitted)).
244.
See supra notes 134–148 and accompanying text.
245.
See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Note, Rhetoric or Rights? When Culture and Religion
Bar Girls’ Right to Education, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 1073, 1111 (2004).
246.
In Dahlab, the Court asserts that wearing the headscarf is incompatible with gender equality because “it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in
the Koran.” Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463.
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coexistence between different groups in society in light of an assessment
of likely threats to personal and state security (public order).247
Before proceeding, it is important to note a certain ambiguity regarding how the notion of “the rights and freedoms of others” operates as a
ground of limitation. The question is whether this term refers to other
rights enumerated in the ECHR (in which case it is arguably redundant)
or to some other category of unspecified fundamental interests (in which
case it is indeterminate).248 Thus, in Otto-Preminger the limitation imposed on freedom of expression was justified on the basis that respect
249
for the religious feelings of believers was guaranteed in Article 9. In
Wingrove, however, the need to protect against “seriously offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Christians” was justified on the
basis of protecting the “rights of others,” which was then said only to be
“fully consonant with the aim of the protections afforded by Article 9.”250
This is important because the act of balancing one right against another requires a different mode of analysis than balancing a right against
some identified individual or collective interest (such as reputation or
collective identity). It is unclear on the basis of these cases whether the
“right to be free from injury to religious feelings” is thus encompassed
within the terms of Article 9(1), as suggested in Otto-Preminger, or
within the “rights and freedoms of others”—read as a limitation on free
speech in Article 10(2)—as suggested in Wingrove.
This ambiguity derives from an ambivalence on the part of the Court
regarding through which of two rival liberal traditions to interpret the
proper scope of religious freedom and the meaning of public order. In
many of the cases it is often difficult to disentangle the two grounds of
247.
See supra note 104–109 and accompanying text. The same point can be applied in
the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1993).
248.
See, e.g., Chassagnou v. France, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, 65–66.
Where these “rights and freedoms” are themselves among those guaranteed by the
Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted that the need to protect them may
lead States to restrict other rights or freedoms likewise set forth in the Convention. . . . It is a different matter where restrictions are imposed on a right or freedom
guaranteed by the Convention in order to protect “rights and freedoms” not, as
such, enunciated therein. In such a case only indisputable imperatives can justify
interference with enjoyment of a Convention right.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Jacco Bomhoff, The Rights and Freedoms of Others: The
ECHR and Its Peculiar Category of Conflicts Between Individual Fundamental Rights, in
Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights 619 (Eva Brems ed., 2008).
249.
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1994).
250.
Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1957, 1958 (1996); see also
Barthold Case, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1985) (holding that a veterinary doctor could be
disciplined for violating a ban on advertising as the measure was imposed “in order to prevent
the applicant from acquiring a commercial advantage over professional colleagues,” a justification found to come within the category of the “rights of others”).
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limitation that the Court tends to run seamlessly together. In Șahin, for
example, was the limitation on the freedom to wear the Islamic headscarf justified by the threat posed by militant Islam to republican values,
or state security, or both (“public order”); or by the patriarchal and coercive nature of Islam and the pressure this exerts on other Muslim and
non-Muslim students, or the threat posed to peaceful relations between
groups, or again both (the “rights of others”)?
If it was the former, how exactly was the Court to draw the line between the right to religious freedom and amorphous terms such as
“militant democracy” or the proper nature of “secularism”?251 If it was
the latter, are concerns about pressure or proselytizing sufficient to outweigh the exercise of a fundamental right? Consider, for example, the
harm caused by the hurtful and offensive speech at issue in the Danish
cartoons controversy.252 For many commentators, this offense to religious
sensibilities was not thought to justify any limitation on the right to free
speech in Article 10, either because it did not fall within the scope of
Article 9 or because it was outweighed by the superior normative value
placed on free speech in a democratic society. Why then does the more
attenuated notion of harm at issue in the wearing or display of a religious
symbol justify limitations on the right to religious freedom? No right to
be free from the presence of religious symbols can be said to be protected by Article 10, and even if the wearing of a headscarf does
constitute some form of pressure or proselytization, why—without additional argument—does this justify a limitation on Article 9, which (as
noted by Judge Tulkens in Șahin) is equally fundamental to a democratic
society? This seems plausible only if one has already assumed a priori a
particular conception of the right to religious freedom (for example, in
the form of a belief or conscience that is private and autonomously chosen) and of the public sphere (for example, in the form of neutrality in
the laïque sense).
In this Section, I argue that the different approaches in the Court’s
reading of Article 9(2) can be traced to two rival traditions in liberal
thought. In the first, a “civil” philosophical tradition, public order is defined in terms of social peace, and the right to religious liberty is
conceived in broadly jurisdictional terms. In the second, a “metaphysical” philosophical tradition, public order is defined in terms of a
substantive theory of justice (the “secular public sphere” discussed in
251.
See supra text accompanying note 137.
252.
See Danchin, Defaming Muhammad, supra note 180; cf. Andrew F. March, Speech
and the Sacred: Is Religiously Injurious Speech a Problem for Secular Political Theory?
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_i d=1642754 (arguing that secular arguments should not value religious sentiments
over other values).
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Part I) and the right to religious liberty is conceived in terms of the values of autonomy and freedom of conscience.
In its Article 9 jurisprudence the Court has, often imperceptibly, invoked each of these traditions at different times either to accept or to
deny claims to religious freedom. In the discussion that follows, I first
briefly describe the history of these two intellectual traditions and their
emergence from the moral and political thought of the early modern Enlightenment before illustrating their contemporary significance in light
of recent reforms in England abolishing the offense of blasphemy and
introducing a new offense of incitement to religious hatred.
1. Rival Enlightenments
In his seminal work reinterpreting early modern German intellectual
history, Ian Hunter rejects the notion of a single Enlightenment and
shows how what he calls “[t]he jurisprudential or civil enlightenment of
the 1680s [differed profoundly] from the (Kantian) philosophical [or
253
“metaphysical”] enlightenment of the 1780s,” a century later. It is here
that we start to see the origins of two distinct conceptions of the public
sphere and of the distinction between the public and private in modern
liberal thought.
In the civil tradition, “it is religion and morality that define the private domain, their inward and unenforceable character defining the
kingdom of truth.”254 Conversely, the public sovereign domain is defined
by the use of coercion to preserve social peace. By partitioning theology
via a statist natural law, it was sought to “separate the pursuit of moral
regeneration from the exercise of civil sovereignty.”255 Under this view,
civil authority is understood “in terms of the maintenance of social peace
by a government exercising supreme power in a religiously or morally
indifferent manner.”256 Contrary to the later Kantian view, the private
sphere is thus to be “unconditionally free” unless it disturbs social peace.
This civil philosophy gave expression to the “desacralization of politics” that had been achieved in the mid-seventeenth century by jurists who
were “seeking a way out of religious civil war. The civil philosophers were
thus not attempting to institute a new integral moral-political governance
of a total society—one based on a secular political philosophy—but to
separate the maintenance of political order from the pursuit of moral regeneration.”257 This led over time to the “spiritualisation of religion,”
253.
Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in
Early Modern Germany 7 (2001).
254.
Id. at 376.
255.
Id. at 367.
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
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which undermined religious orthodoxy, and to the argument that “salvation came instead from a purely personal inner relation to God.”258
Conversely, the public civil domain would be governed “absolutely,” according to jurists such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf,
and Christian Thomasius, but only “on the condition that the sovereign
259
power remained indifferent to all transcendent truths.” This led to the
“desacralisation of politics” and thinking about the purposes “of the state
in quasi-Hobbesian terms; that is, in terms of maintaining external and
internal security while eschewing all higher-level religious and moral
aims.”260 The purpose was not “to defend individual freedom of conscience,” but “to deprive the churches of all civil and political authority,
thereby . . . establishing a de-confessionalised state as the means of
maintaining a legally enforced toleration between the rival religious
communities.”261
In both instances, Hunter argues that the “key elements of early
liberalism—varying degrees of toleration and church-state separation—
formed part of the religious settlements that brought these wars [of religion] to an end . . . [and] laid down the central cultural, political and legal
protocols for the liberal governance of multi-religious societies.”262
Today, we see resonances of this philosophy in political theories such as
263
Stepan’s notion of the “twin tolerations” and in laws outlawing incite264
ment to religious hatred. We also see these resonances in legal regimes
regulating the relationship between church and state in countries such as
Germany, which continue to be shaped by the principles of “separation,
secularity of the state, freedom of religion, and equal rights for all religions and religious communities within a pluralistic system.”265
258.
Ian Hunter, Religious Offences and Liberal Politics: From the Religious Settlements to Multi-Cultural Society 8 (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:9933/SacrilegeUQ.pdf.
259.
Hunter, supra note 253, at 367.
260.
See Hunter, supra note 258, at 8.
261.
Id. at 9–10.
262.
See id. at 3.
263.
See Stepan, supra note 163, at 37–57. “[T]win tolerations [are defined as] the
minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political
institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis
political institutions.” Id. at 37.
264.
See infra Part III.B.2.
265.
Martin Heckel, The Impact of Religious Rules on Public Life in Germany, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, supra note 14, at 191–92. The contemporary
relevance of the liberal civil philosophical tradition can be seen in Heckel’s observation that at
least five “complicating factors” in relations between the state and religious communities
continue to exist in Germany today: (1) the “aim and function of the secular law is to secure
outward peace and earthly welfare” whereas “all institutions and activities of the church are
dependent on and limited by the confession of faith,” with the result that they are “deeply
incommensurable, heterogeneous, and quite often incompatible”; (2) the secular state “does
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The difficulty, however, is that these “liberal political and legal
regimes contain features which are irreducible to their main modern
266
forms of philosophical justification.” One response is to say that these historical settlements are merely factual or “non-ideal” in relation to
post-Kantian political philosophies. But as Hunter argues, this risks
overlooking the “normative dimensions of the historical arrangements
themselves” as well as a “kind of philosopher’s self-delusion” which
imagines that “political norms arrived at through rational introspection
have an intrinsic moral force, regardless of their capacity to engage the
historical political-legal order.”267
This becomes evident when we consider the second metaphysical
tradition. As discussed in Part III.A, in this regime it is the “individual’s official duties that define the private domain,” while the public
domain is constituted by noncoercive intellectual communication and
community; a rational public sphere that will gradually displace the
state altogether through the creation of a people no longer in need of
political coercion—a “self-governance and self-perfection of a democratic moral community.”268
not derive its legitimacy from any normative theological assumption or even ecclesiastical
authorization” whereas the “spiritual and sacramental aspects of ecclesiastical law transcend
the competencies and the tasks of the secular state” with the result that church and state “meet
as independent entities, in ways however which are much more complex than those addressed
by public international law”; (3) the “legal powers of both church and state compete and thus
create conflicts and problems of loyalty . . . within the same human being (‘idem civis et christianus’), on the same territory (both secular and ecclesiastical), [and] concerning the same
social and cultural subject matters”; (4) the “difference between ecclesiastical and secular
values also creates problems,” for while the “Christian churches have accepted the secularity
of the state and the responsibility of the ‘secular’ for its own sphere . . . in the church’s teaching, even this secular sphere must be aligned with and limited by theological explanations of
the world as the good creation of God, on the one hand, and as a sinful world to be contained
by secular power according to the commandments of God, on the other”; and, (5) each of
these factors combine to ensure that “tensions between church and state and their respective
legal orders are inevitable” especially in “matters of education, matrimonial and penal laws.”
Id. at 192–95.
266.
See Hunter, supra note 258, at 1. Consider, for example, the historical relationship
between the Vatican and the Italian state, or the Church of England and the United Kingdom.
267.
See id.
268.
Hunter, supra note 253, at 376. Like Foucault, see supra note 171, Hunter observes that this Kantian “inversion of the usual conception of private and public has
understandably struck many commentators as anomalous.” Hunter, supra note 253, at 376.
“It is . . . in envisaging the moral renovation of political governance through the figure of the
rational community—the figure known today as ‘rational communication in the public
sphere’—that Kantian metaphysics assumes its full neo-confessional form.” Id. The “intense
pressure to make the state ethical and accountable [threatens to collapse] the hard-won separation of the pursuit of moral regeneration and the exercise of civil authority.” This is because,
while the culture of civil philosophy “treats this separation as the condition of governing a
liberal society,” the culture of metaphysical philosophy “regards it as something to be overcome.” Id.
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The Kantian philosophical system thus effects a double transformation by simultaneously rationalizing religion and sacralizing reason in a
morally grounded state. Thus, in his Religion Within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason,269 Kant develops the notion of a purely “rational religion,”
which is premised on the exclusion of theology from theoretical reason
and the grounding of faith in only practical (moral) reason. In this way,
religion is to be controlled by the demands of morality.270 At the same
time, moral aspiration is also central to Kant’s system of ethics. In his
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he argues that the “proper
object of aspiration” for rational agents is the “good will,” which, in order to be good without limitation, is a “transcendent object of
aspiration.”271 This moral aspiration for a good will is “not just a hope for
external results, but also, and no less important, for a perfection of the
agent’s own inner moral life.”272 On the basis of these two critical moves,
the political community thus becomes treated
as the devolved “sensible” form of the moral or spiritual community. As a result, in rationalist political metaphysics, political
and legal rule appear as a debased mode of governance, required
only until the moral community regains its capacity for reciprocal collective self-governance, which will appear in the form of
the general will of a total or “unlimited society.” At this point the
need for law and state will wither away, displaced by the moral
sovereignty of the community of rational beings, who . . . will
273
form an “ethico-civil society” or “kingdom of God on earth.”

269.
Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Religion
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason And Other Writings 31 (Allen Wood &
George di Giovanni eds., trans., 1998).
270.
Robert Merrihew Adams, Introduction, in Religion Within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason And Other Writings, supra note 269, at vii–viii (noting that, for Kant, “the
inability of our theoretical faculties to prove the truth or falsity of religious claims leaves room
for our practical reason to determine our religious stance”); see also O’Neill, supra note 170
(explaining that, for Kant, religion is a vehicle for maintaining a sense of hope and morality).
While critical of both theology and organized church practice, Kant’s rational religion was the
“product of intense engagement with the Protestant Christianity in which he was raised, and
which was the established religion of the Prussian state of which he was a subject.” Adams,
supra, at xi. Kant’s critique of organized religion meant that, for him, the aim of the ideal
church is strictly ethical, i.e., “to inculcate voluntary compliance with the laws of virtue,
which cannot properly be enforced by any human institution because they extend to motivation and govern the inner life.” Id. at xxviii.
271.
Adams, supra note 270, at xiii–xiv.
272.
Id. at xxvi.
273.
Hunter, supra note 253, at 376. “The Kantian critique of positivist jurisprudence
thus represents the anti-juridical revenge of a metaphysics dedicated to reversing the law’s
desacralisation of civil governance.” Id. at 370.
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What conclusions can we draw from Hunter’s analysis for contemporary analysis under Article 9(2)? To the extent that modern liberal
theory remains committed to a politics founded in rational moral selfgovernance in the Kantian and Rawlsian modes, it misunderstands the
statist character of early modern liberalism and the normative dimensions of the early modern religious settlements. Founding liberal rights,
such as the right to religious freedom as today codified in the ECHR,
were not derived from the moral capacities of rational individuals or
moral communities. Rather, they were grounded in the state’s capacity to
pacify warring communities by withdrawing civil power from the moral
domain and concentrating it solely in the maintenance of external order.
The suggestion that the more recent history and philosophy of liberal
thought—eighteenth century Enlightenment ideas of the rights of man
and democracy—led to the ascent of modern, tolerant, inclusive, liberal
states is deeply mistaken. The European state was a nation-state first,
which emerged in the early modern era following massive religious conflict, intolerance, and exclusion.274 As contemporary liberal-nationalists
remind us, it is the assumption of membership in a nation-state coextensive with a single national culture that underlies accounts of rights and
obligations in the liberal state.275 Certainly, individual religious liberty as
an ideal is more realizable in a state already comprised of a dominant
majority that shares the same understanding of the public-private divide
and conception of the good. By the late eighteenth century, the idea that
“personal security and religious toleration depended on the pacification
of fratricidal moral communities by a desacralised state” was largely
forgotten and replaced by the notion of individual rights held by selfgoverning moral communities against the state.276
2. From Blasphemy to Incitement to Religious Hatred
In order to illustrate what is at stake in limitations analyses based on
the grounds of public order and the rights of others, let us briefly consider the debates and reforms that have led to the abolition of the
common law offenses of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in the United
Kingdom. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the British
274.
See Peter G. Danchin, Emergence and Structure, supra note 22, at 501–22.
275.
Thus, various scholars draw a connection between individual liberty and the need
for a collective cultural life, which is said to be possible only in a nation-state. See Tamir,
supra note 206; Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. Phil. 439
(1990). Others link democratic consent theory to national self-determination. See Harry Beran,
Self-Determination: A Philosophical Perspective, in Self-Determination in the Commonwealth 23, 27 (W. J. Macartney ed., 1988). Yet others view national self-determination
within a communitarian conception. See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of
Liberalism, 18 Pol. Theory 21 (1990).
276.
Hunter, supra note 253, at 368.
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government introduced the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill
which sought, inter alia, to amend the Public Order Act 1986 to extend
its provisions on incitement to racial hatred to include incitement to religious hatred.277 The effort failed initially in the House of Lords, but in
2005 the government reintroduced the Bill and Parliament finally enacted the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which creates a new
offense of stirring up hatred against persons on religious grounds.278 On
May 8, 2008, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 then proceeded to abolish the “common law offences of blasphemy and
blasphemous libel” in England and Wales.279
As already seen in the case of Mr. Choudhury’s failed petition to the
280
European Commission on Human Rights, the English law of blasphemy historically “extended only to the Church of England and in
certain respects to Christianity as a whole.”281 It was for this reason that
the offense became subject to review by a House of Lords Select Committee during the 2003 debate over whether to introduce a new offense
of incitement to religious hatred which would extend in effect the law’s
277.
See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 2001-2, H.C. Bill [49] cl. 36–38,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/049/2002049.pdf.
For discussion, see generally Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September?, 65 Modern L. Rev. 724 (2002).
278.
Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, §§ 29A–29B (Gr. Brit.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2007/20072490.htm (defining religious hatred in Section 29A as
“hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious
belief” and the offense itself in Section 29B as being committed by “[a] person who uses
threatening words or behavior, or displays any written material which is threatening . . . if he
intends thereby to stir up religious hatred”).
279.
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c. 4, § 79 (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080004_en_1.
280.
Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17439/90, 12 Hum. Rts. L.J. 172 (1991).
281.
Danchin, Defaming Muhammad, supra note 180, at 23.
In R v. Lemon, [1979] 1 All E.R. 898, 921–22, Lord Scarman criticized blasphemous libel at common law on the grounds that it did not extend to “protect the
religious beliefs and feelings of non-Christians” (which was necessary in an “increasingly plural society such as that of modern Britain”) but rather belonged to a
“group of criminal offences designed to safeguard the internal tranquility of the
kingdom.” The rationale for the limited scope of the offences is related to the historical relationship between the state and nation (which is dominantly Protestant) in
Britain.
Id. at 23 n.84. Thus, in the Salman Rushdie case it was stated that
all offences of this kind are not only offences to God, but crimes against the law of
the land, and are punishable as such, inasmuch as they tend to destroy those obligations whereby civil society is bound together; and it is upon this ground that the
Christian religion constitutes part of the law of England.
R v. Chief Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex Parte Choudhury), [1991] 1 All E.R. 306 (Q.B)
at 306, 313 (quoting R v. Williams [1797] 26 State Tr. 654, 714).
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protection to Britain’s Islamic and other religious communities. The Select Committee made the point as follows:
The law of blasphemy is discriminatory. It prevents (say) a Muslim from speaking about the sacred entities of Christianity in
ways that would not be criminal if a Christian were to speak in
similar terms about Islam. This violates Article 14 (prohibition
of discrimination) taken together with Article 10, unless an objective and rational justification for the difference in treatment
can be shown. Furthermore, failure to protect a Muslim against
abuse of his religion might also violate Article 14 taken together
with Article 9. Although the European Commission rejected an
application based on Article 14 taken together with [Article] 9 in
the “Satanic Verses” case, that predated the heightened respect
for protection against abuse shown by the Court in OttoPreminger Institut . . . and might not be decided in the same way
today.282
At the conclusion of its proceedings, however, the Committee was
unable to make any specific recommendations regarding either abolition
of existing blasphemy laws or the creation of a new offense of incitement to religious hatred. As Hunter has argued, the Committee’s
underlying problem was the apparent incompatibility between the language of the ECHR and the terms in which European political and legal
orders have historically resolved problems of sectarian conflict and freedom of religion:
As the inheritors of these settlements, liberal political and legal
orders are not involved in the game of balancing potentially conflicting fundamental rights, but in the quite different task of
adjusting degrees of freedom (whether of speech or religion) in
light of an assessment of the likely threats to personal and state
283
security arising.
The Committee thus acknowledged that “continued tranquility” in the
United Kingdom between all groups in society—religious and nonreligious—depended not only on “mutual tolerance” but also on “equality of
protection from intolerance on the basis of religion or belief or no belief.”284 But, not only was there no apparent way of reconciling such a
conception of toleration with the liberal rights algebra, this approach was
further in tension with the traditional conception of England as a “state
282.
Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales (London: House of
Lords, 2003) vol. I, ¶ 41 [hereinafter Select Committee Report].
283.
Hunter, supra note 258, at 15.
284.
Select Committee Report, supra note 282, ¶ 13.
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whose church is part of its constitution;” a state where “religious belief
continues to be a significant component, or even determinant, of social
values;” and thus a state that should “have the role of embodying the
religious identities of its constituent communities.”285 Caught then between the three interrelated policy objectives of needing to maintain
religious peace and public order, ensure respect for fundamental rights,
and protect the religious liberty and collective identity of the nation, the
Committee was paralyzed in a situation where “the actual organisation
of the liberal political and juridical order remains out of reach of a central mode of modern moral reflection.”286
In this respect, the abolition of blasphemy offenses and the enactment of a new offense of incitement to religious hatred in England
reflects the complex dialectic between the two rival liberal traditions.
Further, it is the presence of a non-Christian minority asserting specific
claims to liberty and security in a Christian or post-Christian state during
a situation of heightened religious conflict that makes visible these deeper currents in the English law on religious freedom.
Consider once again the dilemmas facing the House of Lords Select
Committee. One option, urged by the Muslim Council of Britain, was to
extend the laws on blasphemy to all religious communities.287 This, in
effect, was the basis of Mr. Choudhury’s complaint to the European
Commission. Another option, urged by the Muslim Council for Religious and Racial Harmony, was to enact new protections against
incitement to religious hatred, including against “sacrilege and abuse of
religious sanctities.”288 The Select Committee was in the end unable to
choose between these proposals because of the complex way in which
the English law on religious offenses is entangled in matters of both public order and religious freedom.
The law of blasphemy is in this respect both a public order offense
and a law that protects the religious liberty of English Christians. The
public order of England rests in part on the political establishment of the
Church of England as reflected in the Anglican Settlement. Extending
the law of blasphemy to include Muslim or other religious minorities
could destabilize these historical and deeply embedded foundations of
285.
Hunter, supra note 258, at 17.
286.
Id. at 16.
287.
Select Committee Report, supra note 282, ¶ 35.
288.
Hunter, supra note 258, at 13 (quoting the Muslim Council for Religious and Racial
Harmony). This proposal reflects the extent to which blasphemy offences are today viewed as
having lost their basis in sacrilege and transformed instead into public order offenses in the
deconfessionalized liberal state. As it gradually evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the crime of blasphemy no longer was defined in terms of violating “things and places
inhabited by a transcendent divinity,” but rather as the “giving of offence in a manner that
might lead to civil disorder or violence.” Id. at 10–11.
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the state itself. As a law that protects the religious freedom of Christians
in England, the scope of this protection extends beyond an individual
right to have or maintain a religion to a collective right of the nation itself to determine the place of religion in the public sphere of the state.
Again, extending the law of blasphemy to protect the religious freedom
of Muslims could destabilize this contingent religious settlement and
increase the likelihood of conflict, not only between Christians and Muslims, but also between secularists and believers of all faiths. And yet, as
Mr. Choudhury correctly argued, maintaining the status quo constituted
a clear double standard and discrimination on the basis of religion
against British Muslims in violation of England’s obligations under the
ECHR. For all these reasons, abolition—as opposed to extension—of the
law of blasphemy appeared the more sensible path.
The enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 represents an attempt to mediate between these complex tensions and claims
of right by employing the civil or pluralist tradition’s notion of public
order. The Act does not create a right to be free from injury to religious
sensibilities as demanded by various members of the British Muslim
community.289 It therefore avoids the vexed question from OttoPreminger of the precise scope of Article 9. It does, however, impose
limitations on freedom of speech in order to protect religious adherents
and their communities from advocacy intended to stir up religious hatred
and hostility. In this respect, it strikes a balance between the rights to
free speech and freedom of religion that favors neither exclusively and
focuses the interpreter instead on the more fact-based criterion of the
need for the state to maintain social peace and public order.290
At the same time, the abolition of the law of blasphemy eliminated
the prior double standard in English law that privileged the collective
289.

Section 29J of the Act expressly excludes

discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of
particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytizing or urging
adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or
belief system.
Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, § 29J (Gr. Brit.), available at http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2007/20072490.htm.
290.
The Act is therefore not strictly “liberal” in the American free speech sense as it
violates the principle of “no content regulation” and imposes a content-based classification.
See Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of
Speech 16 (1995) (arguing that the “principle of ‘no content regulation’ has emerged as a
central doctrine of First Amendment law”). But cf. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation:
The Visibility of Hate, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1596, 1656 (2010) (arguing, in the context of restrictions on speech imposed by hate speech laws, that the content-based restriction doctrine is a
“blind-alley” and an example of “path-dependency” in First Amendment jurisprudence).
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identity of solely the dominant constituent religious community. Nevertheless, the Church of England remains the established religion of the
state, reflecting the collective right of the English people to selfdetermination and public expression of their collective identity.291 In this
respect, the public sphere is not secular in the antipluralist sense of the
metaphysical Kantian tradition, but more genuinely value pluralist in the
older jurisprudential sense of the civil philosophical tradition.
It is finally interesting to observe how legal and political philosophers today are turning to the notion of human dignity as a mediating
concept between these older discourses which emphasize social peace on
the one hand and individual freedom on the other. Jeremy Waldron thus
invokes John Rawls’s idea of a “well-ordered society”292 to argue that
human dignity is the value underlying the need to protect social groups,
such as racial and religious minorities, from certain forms of group libel.
On this view, legal restrictions on hate speech are set up to “vindicate
public order, not just by preempting violence, but by upholding against
attack a shared, public sense of the basic elements of each person’s status, dignity, and reputation as a citizen or member of society in good
standing—particularly against attacks predicated upon the characteristics
of some particular social group.”293 This notion of public assurance and
freedom from visible manifestations of hatred defines public order in
terms of the equal dignity and status of persons in an effort to avoid—or
at least better manage—controversies over the scope of competing
294
rights. Whether such a maneuver succeeds is beyond the scope of the
291.
Weiler makes the point that Britain, “with its established Church, in which the
Monarch is not only the Head of State but the Head of the Church of England,” has a “constitutional structure [that makes] some kind of judgment that in some way at least Anglicanism is
not illegitimate.” Weiler, supra note 204, at 2.
292.
Waldron, supra note 290, at 1618.
293.
Id. at 1605 (emphasis added).
294.
Waldron states that dignity is a “complex idea, with philosophical as well as political . . . resonances” and, in the sense he is using the term, “dignity is not just a Kantian
philosophical conception of the immeasurable worth of humans considered as moral agents”
but “a matter of status—one’s status as a member of society in good standing.” Id. at 1611–12.
It is a social and legal status that requires us “in our public dealings not to act in a way that
undermines one another’s dignity in this socio-legal sense—and that is the obligation that is
being enforced when we enact and administer laws against group libel.” Id. at 1612. In the
case of hate speech directed against religious minorities—such as the Danish cartoons controversy—group libel does not protect Islam or its founders but rather individual Muslims qua
Muslims: the “civic dignity of the members of a group stands separately from the status of
their beliefs, however offensive an attack upon the Prophet or even upon the Koran may
seem.” Id. at 1612–13. Here, Waldron directs his analysis towards concerns of civic dignity in
a well-ordered society rather than to issues of injury to religious feelings or religious distress,
thus avoiding the kind of complex issues involving religious freedom addressed in OttoPreminger and Wingrove. See also Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Calumny: Bayle, Locke,
Montesquie and Voltaire on Religious Hate Speech 23 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Res. Paper No. 10-80, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699895
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present discussion,295 but it amply demonstrates how theorists continue to
search for ways to reconcile the two liberal traditions regarding the limits of toleration in conflicts between religious groups.
C. Is “Secularism” Necessary in a Democratic Society?
In this final Section, I offer some concluding thoughts on the relationship between the two conceptions of the secular public sphere
discussed in Section III.B and the injunction in Article 9(2) that the freedom to manifest religion or belief shall only be subject to limitations
which are “necessary in a democratic society.”
In her dissent in Șahin, Judge Tulkens expresses concern that the
majority invokes the margin of appreciation and the principles of secularism and equality in Turkey as being essential in democracy in a way
that reverses the usual logic of the right to freedom of religion and belief.296 It is the state that has the onus of showing that a limit under
Article 9(2) is “necessary” and does not impose excessive burdens on
those whose rights are to be limited. And it is further axiomatic to say
that the judicial role of the Strasbourg Court is to protect fundamental
rights against the potentially unjust demands of public order asserted by
states.
The Court’s apparent willingness to adopt, often without argument,
state justifications regarding militant democracy, secularism, and the
nature of Islam is therefore troubling. This Article has argued that there
are deep unarticulated premises underlying the Court’s reasoning regarding Islam and the claims of Muslim communities that conceal an
underlying historical and political reality consisting of relations of power, cultural hegemony, and subordination. The case law dealing with both
Muslim minorities living in European nation-states and competing conceptions of secularism and democracy in Turkey reveals more about the
Court’s anxiety and prejudices toward what is perceived to be the rise of

(arguing that for the “Enlightenment philosophes . . . public order means more than just the
absence of fighting: it includes the peaceful order of civil society and the dignitary order of
ordinary people interacting with one another in ordinary ways,” and “[a]bove all, it conveys a
principle of inclusion and a rejection of the calumnies that tend to isolate and exclude vulnerable religious minorities”).
295.
For a critical discussion, see Danchin, Defaming Muhammad, supra note 180, at
28–32 (arguing that the distinction between defamation and offense rests on controversial
claims regarding the belief-action distinction and conventional (mainly Christian) understandings of speech, religion, and harm).
296.
See supra notes 157, 235, and accompanying text; see also notes 218–222 and accompanying text (concurring separate opinions of Judges Bonello and Power in Lautsi v. Italy,
which sharply distinguish between religious freedom and secularism and argue that the latter
is “optional” in Europe).
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Islamic fundamentalism in Europe and beyond than about any coherent
theory of religious freedom under the ECHR.
In their decision making, the European Court judges have too readily adopted an excessively rationalistic mode of reasoning in their
encounters with Islam, while forgetting—or at a minimum undertheorizing—the rival dialogic mode which has been so pivotal to the
existence of pluralism in the history of religious freedom in Europe
(even though this has emerged both internally and externally within the
historical development of Western Christianity).297 This has had two
distorting effects. First, it has created the paradox that the form of
secularism said to be necessary in a democratic society in cases involving Islam neither exists in fact, nor have its various non-ideal
alternatives precluded the flourishing of democratic values in many of
the states within the secular nomos of the Court itself.
Second, this has generated what I term a “managerial culture of governance” under which the Court’s reasoning seeks to instrumentalize
certain antipluralist and substantive conceptions of both the scope of religious freedom and the nature of the public sphere. The result is that in
cases like Șahin, the Court has devoted its efforts to defending and reaffirming its own beliefs in certain secular conceptions of liberty and
attachment rather than addressing the claims to justice—and real harms
facing—the claimants before it.
This shift confirms what Mahmood suggests are the two contemporary challenges to the dominant understanding of secularism as “the
separation between religion and politics so that an individual may practice her faith freely without coercion and state intervention (the right to
religious freedom).”298 First, much recent work in this area argues “that
the secularization of modern society has historically entailed not so
much the withdrawal of the state from the religious domain, but the
state’s reconfiguration of substantive features of religious life.”299 Second, this has entailed “not so much the elimination of religion from
politics or public life but its reformulation in accord with a normative
model of religiosity—one that is amenable to practices of liberal political rule.”300
By contrast, a genuinely pluralist “culture of justification” adopts an
ethos of cultivation animated not by a comprehensive moral theory governing all ways of life, but rather the search for peaceful coexistence
between different ways of life. Value pluralism in this sense is best un297.
See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
298.
Mahmood, supra note 43, at 1.
299.
Id.
300.
Id. at 2 (“This normative model regards religion primarily to be a matter of privatized belief in a set of creedal propositions to which an autonomous individual gives assent.”).
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derstood as an attempt to reach political settlements and forms of reconciliation between the claims, values, and practices of diverse religious
and cultural communities, and the assertions of right and justice to which
they continually give rise. How this is to be achieved in any particular
situation involving a manifestation of religion or belief can only be the
result of a contingent and circumstantial consensus, derived through intersubjective hermeneutics and critical dialogue.
Such an approach holds that the freedom to manifest religion or belief does not include the right of Muslims in Europe, or any other
majority or minority religious group, to elevate their faith to the established faith governing all others in a political regime. At the same time,
value pluralism requires a “reassessment on the part of secular, enlightened Europeans of their own tendency to treat belief as neatly separable
from disciplinary practices, cultural routines, and the education of sensory experience.”301 I have thus argued previously that, by pursuing an
ethos of engagement in the public sphere among a plurality of controversial theistic and nontheistic perspectives, a value pluralist approach
offers the possibility of opening new ways to transcend this impasse and
reimagine the limits of liberal theory.302
Judge Kovler was accordingly right in Refah to be concerned about
the majority’s uncritical adoption of “terms borrowed from politicoideological discourse such as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘totalitarian
movements’, [and] ‘threat to the democratic regime.’ ”303 He was also
right to express his deep reservations regarding the majority’s rejection
in toto and without argument of Shari’ah, which constitutes a regime
premised on “the concept of a plurality of legal systems” and is the “legal expression of a religion whose traditions go back more than 1,000
years.”304 Indeed, there is a vast and growing literature today on Islam
and human rights as scholars continue to advance sophisticated accounts
305
of the relationship of Islamic law to international human rights norms.
301.
William E. Connolly, Pluralism 58 (2005).
302.
See Danchin, Suspect Symbols, supra note 66, at 61.
303.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 50–51 (2003)
(Kovler J., concurring); see supra note 128.
304.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 50–51 (2003)
(Kovler J., concurring); see supra note 129 and accompanying text. For a critical discussion of
the meaning of Shari’ah in the conditions of modernity, see Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa:
Theory, Practice, Transformations pt. III (2009).
305.
See, e.g., Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic
Law (2003) (discussing the connection between Islamic law and international human rights
covenants); Mahmood Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the
Middle East (1998) (discussing the interplay between Islamism, reform, and human rights in
Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law (1990); Mohammad H.
Fadel, Public Reason as a Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law
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A pertinent example is recent scholarship on Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution306 and the reasoning of the Egyptian Supreme Court in
cases involving claims of right (including claims to religious freedom)
307
under Islamic law. In a notable 1996 case involving the challenge by a
father of two schoolgirls to a ministerial regulation forbidding girls in
public schools from wearing the niqab and requiring parental permission
to wear the hijab, the Court interpreted relevant Qur’anic verses and the
opinions of jurists to hold that the regulation was not ipso facto contrary
to the goals of Shari’ah.308 Regardless of the merits of the decision or the
strength of its reasoning, what is striking about the case is the degree to
which the interpretive methodology of the Court—although expressed in
the vernacular and idioms of Shari’ah—closely tracks the main doctrinal
categories of analysis found in much contemporary human rights discourse.309 It is sadly ironic that even the possibility of this kind of valuepluralist contestation is both overlooked and foreclosed by the majority
judgment in Refah.

Conclusion
Since 2001, the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights has raised anew the question of the relationship between
religion and public order. In its reasoning, the Court has constructed
competing normative accounts of secularism, neutrality, and equality,
either to accept or deny claims to religious liberty while at the same time
granting states a wide margin of appreciation to accommodate majoritarian religious sensibilities in the name of public order.
and International Human Rights Law, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1 (2007) (attempting to reconcile
doctrines of Islam with norms of international human rights law).
306.
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended,
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/
english/laws/constitution/default.aspx. Article 2 provides that “Islam is the Religion of the
State . . . and the principle source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia).” Id. art. 2.
Article 46 further provides that “[t]he State shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practising religious rights.” Id. art. 46.
307.
See, e.g., Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles
Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 379 (2006).
308.
Nathan J. Brown & Clark B. Lombardi, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt
on Islamic Law, Veiling and Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), 21 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 437
(2006) (translating Case No. 8/1996/Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt).
309.
See, e.g., Kilian Bälz, The Secular Reconstruction of Islamic Law: The Egyptian
Supreme Constitutional Court and the ‘Battle Over the Veil’ in State-Run Schools, in Legal
Pluralism in the Arab World 229 (Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger & Laila al-Zwaini
eds., 1999) (reading the Egyptian Supreme Court’s decision as a defense of the secular legal
order).
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This Article has argued that the Court’s interpretative divisions over
the scope of religious freedom in Article 9(1) and the meaning and shape
of the public sphere in Article 9(2) can be traced to two rival liberal traditions: one deriving from a civil philosophy that views the right to
religious liberty in jurisdictional terms and the public sphere in terms of
social peace; the other from a metaphysical philosophy that views the
right to religious liberty in terms of freedom of conscience and the public sphere in terms of a comprehensive moral theory of justice. Both
traditions combine rationalist and dialogic elements, and these remain
encoded in complex ways in the normative logic and structure of Article
9.
The difficulty with the interpretive methodology of the European
Court of Human Rights in cases involving the claims of Muslim
communities is that any assertion of universal authority in the form of
“free-standing” reason is ultimately unpersuasive and tacitly subsumes
majoritarian cultural norms (whether secular or religious) into the
meaning and scope of Article 9. Conversely, innovative work is now being
done to reimagine liberal legal orders so as to encompass more genuinely
pluralist conceptions of the right to religious freedom. It is thus becoming
recognized that religious freedom entails not simply securing the rights of
an individual against incursions by the state or community, but is also tied
to and dependent upon different models of state-religion accommodation
and different traditions of religious tolerance and pluralism.
A better understanding of how religious freedom emerged in the early modern period, and how secular European public spheres arose from
contingent political settlements rather than the categorical demands of
universal reason, suggests the need for a more reflexive selfunderstanding of the premises of Article 9 jurisprudence. This Article
has aimed to make visible how modern secular power both authorizes
certain “religious subjectivities” while simultaneously defining and excluding other “unruly subjects,” whose otherness is “not only the product
of their unruly actions but also an effect of how secular power establishes its claims to truth and normativity.”310
This dialectic of formation and exclusion has further been argued to
rest on a paradox: the idea that the political secularism of the supranational European nomos is simultaneously exceptional and universal.311
The antinomies haunting this contradiction have revealed particular value commitments in both the rationalist and dialogic aspects of the right
310.
Saba Mahmood, Can Secularism Be Other-wise?, in Varieties of Secularism in
a Secular Age 282, 294 (Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen & Craig Calhoun eds.,
2010).
311.
Id. at 290; see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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to religious freedom. The claim successfully to have secured secular authority in the public sphere has been shown to rest on the notion of a
unique “vantage point of epistemic neutrality above history, politics and
culture, from which other histories and political formations can be
marked as either tolerable (assimilable, non-recalcitrant, redeemable,
universalizable) or intolerable (barbaric, inhumane, backward-looking,
pure particularity).”312 But as Part I argued, such accounts of neutrality
and secularity quickly devolve into the “unarticulated liberal strategy of
313
hypostasis or reification of a historically specific political order.” This
was seen, in particular, in the ways in which the term “religion and belief” has been defined and the divide between public and private spheres
demarcated.
At the same time, political secularism claims for itself the mantle of
universality by asserting norms, such as the right to religious freedom,
conceived as entirely separable from specific histories and relations of
power between different groups. Part III argued, however, that only by
engaging the competing histories of the emergence of the right to religious freedom in international law can we start to grasp the norm’s
particular meaning and social significance. Historical inquiry reveals
that rival intellectual traditions and normative dissonances and conflicts
are internal to the right itself. This in turn suggests that the right to religious freedom is not a singular, stable principle existing outside of
culture, spatial geographies, or power, but is a contested, polyvalent concept existing and unfolding within the histories of concrete political
orders.314
Once the right is historically relativized and normatively pluralized
in these ways, the form of nondialogic reasoning employed by the European Court of Human Rights in cases such as Refah and Șahin is
unpersuasive. Properly understood, the deep and continuing history of
312.
Nehal Bhuta, On Common Ground 2–3 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
313.
Id. at 2. The point is well-illustrated in Lautsi in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning
that the crucifix is a “passive symbol” whose presence in Italian state-school classrooms does
not impact the principle of neutrality while, conversely, the Islamic headscarf worn by a public
school teacher in Dahlab was a “powerful external symbol,” the prohibition of which was
“intended to protect the religious beliefs of the pupils and their parents and to apply the principle of denominational neutrality in schools enshrined in domestic law.” Lautsi v. Italy, App.
No. 30814/06, ¶¶ 72–73 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber Mar. 18, 2011); see supra note 212
and accompanying text.
314.
Thus, while Italy has a positive obligation under the ECHR to respect parents’ religious and philosophical convictions, “the fact that there is no European consensus on the
question of the presence of religious symbols in State schools” means that this is “a matter
falling within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State.” Lautsi (Grand Chamber), at
¶ 70. The meaning of the right, in other words, is here not a matter of universal reason but
overlapping consensus (which is contextual and varies between states).
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entanglement between Christianity and political secularism—and of encounters between European and non-European traditions of
315
secularism —makes the notion of Islamic legal norms and Shari’ah
“within the context of a plurality of legal systems” uncontroversial. The
failure to critically engage Europe’s own warring histories of political
secularism thus results in a failure of recognition and a managerial mode
of imperial liberalism at the very moment when a reflexive ethos of engagement is most needed.
The asserted uniqueness of the liberal political order as neutral and
secular is, at bottom, a problem of illusion. The asserted universality of
the right to religious freedom is, at bottom, a problem of power and of
failures of recognition resulting from its exercise. It is only by better understanding the latter—the historical relationship of the European
supranational nomos to its others—that space may conceivably be found
to reimagine the former, and thus to see beyond the current limits of the
Court’s jurisprudence.

315.
The history of “Christian secularism” has both internal and external dimensions to
its relationship with its others. Saba Mahmood thus criticizes Charles Taylor for his sharp
delineation in A Secular Age, see supra note 89, of a spatial geography—the “North Atlantic West”—without taking into account Christianity’s encounters with its others.
These others are both internal to the geospatial boundary of the North Atlantic (Judaism in Europe marked the outer limits of Euro-Christian civilization well into the
twentieth century) and external as Christianity encountered numerous other religious traditions in the course of its missionary and colonizing projects (across Latin
America, Australia, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East). These encounters did not
simply leave Christianity untouched but transformed it from within, a transformation that should be internal to any self-understanding of Christianity.
Mahmood, supra note 310, at 285. Until such encounters become “internal to Christianity’s
current preoccupations,” there can be no possibility of intrareligious dialogue given that the
“other is not even acknowledged in political, existential, or epistemological terms” and Christian secularism thus “remains blind to the normative assumptions and power of Western
Christianity.” Id. at 299; see supra note 87 and accompanying text.

